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This paper argues that expectations are an important element that needs to be included into 
the analysis of the effects of the minimum wage on employment. We show in a standard 
matching model that the observed employment effect is higher the lower is the likelihood 
associated with the minimum wage variation. On the other side, there is a significant 
anticipation effect, ignored in the literature. This property is able to explain the controversial 
results found in the empirical studies. When the policy is anticipated, the effect at the time of 
the actual variation is small and potentially hard to identify. The model is tested on Spanish 
data, taking advantage of the unexpected change in the minimum wage following the election 
of Zapatero in 2004. 
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Minimum wages were ￿rst introduced in Australia and New Zealand in the late 19th century
and are now in force in more than 90% of all countries (ILO, 2006). Despite its widespread
use, the minimum wage is still a debated issue. Its supporters assert that it helps prevent
the excess of exploitation in the labor market and increases the living standards of the lowest
paid up to some minimum acceptable standards. Detractors claim that the minimum wage
may price low-skill workers out of market, harming rather than helping the poorest workers.
Economic theory does not provide a clear prediction about the employment e⁄ects of the
minimum wage: in a competitive labor market a binding minimum wage reduces employment,
but this is not necessarily the case in a monopsonistic labor market, where a higher wage
may attract more workers without dampening the labor demand. The empirical literature is
also controversial. On the one hand, older studies support the idea of a negative employment
e⁄ect of the minimum wage.1 On the other hand, more recent contributions are characterized
by a wide range of estimates.
This paper proposes a mechanism capable of reconciling those con￿ icting ￿ndings. The
key ingredient is the introduction of expectations in the analysis of the minimum wage policy.
In fact, minimum wage changes can often be foreseen. This is particularly true in countries
such as France and Spain, where the statutory minimum wage is set to be updated every
year, or in Italy and Germany, that have no minimum wage laws but rely on collective
agreements between employer groups and trade unions, renegotiated at de￿ned dates. In the
light of these features, the minimum wage policy cannot be considered as an unpredictable
shock; on the contrary rational agents form expectations about minimum wage movements
and adjust their current behavior to the future economic environment. Hence, when the
minimum wage actually changes the employment adjustment may be small because it has
been partly anticipated.
We argue that the empirical literature has not been able to ￿nd conclusive results because
the minimum wage variations under analysis were expected, so that the observed employment
e⁄ect was relatively small and potentially hard to identify. Furthermore, the anticipation
e⁄ect has been neglected, leading to an underestimate of the overall employment e⁄ect.
In this paper we develop a theoretical model that extend the Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) model. The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions, het-
erogeneous stochastic matching, and endogenous separations. Expectations are taken into
account: agents know that the minimum wage may increase in the future. In this frame-
work, we compare expected and unexpected changes in the minimum wage. Their e⁄ects on
employment di⁄er in timing: the expected policy in￿ uences the labor market outcomes both
before and after the actual variation, while the unexpected one has no anticipation e⁄ect.
The predictions of the model are then tested using Spanish data. Spain provides a
suitable environment in order to test the role played by expectations. The Spanish statutory
minimum wage is set to be updated yearly, and changes in this policy are usually predictable.
But this is not always the case: the increase in the Spanish minimum wage following the
election of JosØ Luis Rodr￿guez Zapatero was largely unexpected. Zapatero became the new
prime minister on 14th March 2004, three days after the terrorist attack to Atocha station.
The attack favored Zapatero to the detriment of the former prime minister, JosØ Mar￿a Aznar.
1See Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982) for a review.
2The unexpected victory of the Socialist Party was soon followed by an equally unexpected
increase in the minimum wage. Thus we estimate and compare the e⁄ect of the unexpected
rise in the minimum wage after Zapatero election with the expected variations in other
periods. Our analysis relies on individual data from the Economically Active Population
Survey, 2000-2006. This longitudinal dataset is suitable to study not only the employment
e⁄ect, but also the evolution of ￿ ows in and out of employment. The analysis of ￿ ows allows
to identify the exact source for employment changing and to better appreciate the role of
the minimum wage even when the net disemployment e⁄ect is negligible.2
In line with the literature, we identify the a⁄ected group with the youth, and a di⁄erence
in di⁄erence approach is implemented using the adult as a control group. One possible
concern is that not all the young workers are actually low-paid.3 We test several speci￿cations
with more restrictive treatment and control groups.
Our results show that the employment e⁄ect depends on the nature of the minimum wage
variation: expected policies have a signi￿cant anticipation e⁄ect on employment stock and
￿ ows. The magnitude of the anticipation e⁄ect is not negligible, but comparable with the
e⁄ects at the time of the policy and in the following period. Temporary workers turn out to
be the most a⁄ected, while separations do not signi￿cantly increase for permanent workers.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature on the
minimum wage. The role of expectations is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the
model, both with and without expectations, and compare the resulting disemployment e⁄ect
of the minimum wage policy. The empirical analysis is detailed in Section 5 and Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The employment e⁄ect of the minimum wage
The minimum wage policy is mainly a redistributive instrument; nevertheless economic lit-
erature focuses on its employment e⁄ects.4 The simple model of competitive labor market
predicts that increasing the minimum wage above the competitive level leads to higher un-
employment. Similar conclusions are drawn from a basic matching model, where equilibrium
conditions require a rise in the minimum wage to be compensated by a lower market tight-
ness, that means lower vacancy posting and lower job creation. However there is no clear
evidence in support of the disemployment e⁄ect of the minimum wage.
The empirical literature can be divided in two waves: the ￿rst one ending in 1982,
reviewed in Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982); and the second one, the "New Minimum Wage
Research", starting in 1991 and summarized in Neumark and Wascher (2007). Di⁄erent
econometric strategies have been used to asses the impact of the minimum wage on youth
employment.5 The First Wave of the Minimum Wage Research uses mainly time-series and
aggregate data to estimate correlations between employment and the minimum wage. They
2The advantages of analyzing ￿ ows generated by the minimum wage policy have been ￿rst recognized in
Portugal and Cardoso (2006).
3See Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) for a brief discussion.
4Notably, some exceptions are Flinn (2006) and Boadway and Cu⁄ (2001) who also analyze the e⁄ect of
the minimum wage on welfare.
5Empirical studies typically limit their attention to young workers, because they are more likely to be
employed at the minimum wage.
3generally ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of the minimum wage on youth employment, as summarized
by Brown et al. (1982):
"time-series studies typically ￿nd that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage
reduces teenage employment by one to three percent" (p. 524).
But this approach has been widely criticized. The use of aggregate data may leave out
many relevant variables giving rise to spurious correlation.6
The New Minimum Wage Research relies on case studies and panel data with controversial
results. Long panel studies that incorporate both country and time variation in minimum
wages tend, on the whole, to ￿nd negative and statistically signi￿cant employment e⁄ects
of minimum wage increases, while zero or positive e⁄ects of the minimum wage on low-skill
employment are supported by the majority of the U.S. studies using either short panel data
or case studies on a state-speci￿c change in the minimum wage.7
A well-known example of case study is the 1992 increase in New Jersey￿ s minimum
wage studied in a series of papers by Card and Krueger (1994, 2000). They implement a
di⁄erence in di⁄erence approach comparing the evolution of fast-food employment in New
Jersey with restaurant in eastern Pennsylvania as a control group. Their estimates show
either no signi￿cant e⁄ect of the increase in the minimum wage on employment, either
a positive e⁄ect. These results have been questioned by Neumark and Wascher (2000).
They replicate the analysis of Card and Krueger (1994) replacing their survey based data
with administrative payroll records, and ￿nd a negative e⁄ect on New Jersey￿ s employment
relative to Pennsylvania. But the debate is still open: Card and Krueger (2000) replied to
Neumark and Wascher￿ s criticism and con￿rmed their previous results even using payroll
data.
Some studies in the New Minimum Wage Research exploit panel data to identify the
employment e⁄ects of the minimum wage. For instance, Card (1992) studies the April 1990
increase in the federal minimum wage over di⁄erent states, taking advantage of the variation
in the distribution of wages. Low-wage regions should be more a⁄ected by the minimum
wage change. Regressing the change in state teen employment on the fraction of a⁄ected
workers (i.e. teenagers who earned between the old and the new minimum wage in 1989),
and controls, Card does not ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the 1990 minimum wage increase. On
the other side, Neumark and Wascher support the disemployment e⁄ect of the minimum
wage in a series of papers (1992, 2002, 2007b). An important di⁄erence among these studies
is the measure of the minimum wage: Card considers the fraction of workers at or near
the minimum wage, while Neumark and Wascher make use of the Kaitz index. The Kaitz
index is a coverage-weighted minimum wage relative to the average wage and it is the most
common measure of the bite of the minimum wage. Nonetheless many concerns have been
raised with regard to its computation and its suitability to account for the minimum wage
6The shortcomings of the time-series approach are discussed in detailed in Card and Krueger (1995). They
claim that minimum wage e⁄ects on employment should ideally be examined using microdata sources and
a natural-experiment methodology. Furthermore, they argue that only substantial changes in the minimum
wage can be sensibly used to estimate the employment e⁄ect.
7In their review, Neumark and Wascher (2007) argue that the lack of signi￿cant employment losses found
in some analysis could be due to the short time horizon cutting o⁄ part of the adjustment process.
4impact. Dolado et al. (1996) and Neumark and Wascher (2007) discuss the issue from several
perspectives, but the suitability of the Kaitz index is still an open question.
In the end, the empirical literature has not yet been able to reach an agreement upon the
e⁄ect of the minimum wage on employment, neither to establish the correct way to handle
this issue.
How does economic theory explain the empirical controversial ￿ndings? Few cogent
models have been proposed. One is the monopsony model, extensively studied and enriched
by Alan Manning (1995, 2003, 2004) in several papers. Firms are assumed to have some
power in retaining workers and, therefore, some discretion over the wages they pay. If the
minimum wage lies between the monopolistic wage and the competitive wage, a rise in its
level may increase employment enhancing labor supply without dampening labor demand,
but lowering ￿rms￿rent. Otherwise the minimum wage has a negative e⁄ect on employment.
Monopsony can account for both positive and negative e⁄ects of the minimum wage, but
the coherence of this framework has been questioned with regard to low wage labor markets.
Those markets are characterized by a large number of relatively small employers and high
worker mobility; hence they are closer to perfect competition then to monopsony.
A variant of the monopsony model is the e¢ ciency wage model developed by Rebitzer
and Taylor (1996). Employers have an incentive to limit employment in order to minimize
the supervision cost, that is assumed to be increasing in ￿rm￿ s size. Higher minimum wage
helps to solve the moral hazard problem: the cost of job loss to workers currently employed
increases with the wage paid, so that the threat to dismiss shirking workers becomes more
e⁄ective and lower resources need to be devoted to supervision and may be used to increase
employment.
A matching model with endogenous search e⁄ort is also capable to produce di⁄erent
employment e⁄ect of the minimum wage. On one side, an increase in the minimum wage
rises the value of working and may provide an incentive for unemployed to exert more e⁄ort
in searching for a job. On the other side, the ￿rm￿ s rent diminishes and fewer vacancy are
posted, so that the probability of getting a job decreases with opposite e⁄ect on the search
e⁄ort. When the net impact on search e⁄ort is positive, the matching process becomes more
e¢ cient and may compensate for the reduction in job openings.8
In this paper we propose a di⁄erent mechanism to account for a wide range of empirical
results. Instead of focusing on the characteristics of the labor market, we look at the charac-
teristic of the policy under analysis. A variation in the minimum wage may be expected or
unexpected. Depending on this distinction, the employment e⁄ect will be di⁄erent. In par-
ticular, we show that the disemployment e⁄ect following an expected change underestimates
the overall e⁄ect.
The empirical literature has till now focused on the ex-post e⁄ect of expected variations
in the minimum wage policy. Since this is only a component of the overall e⁄ect, it may be
small and hard to identify. Marginal di⁄erences in the econometric strategy, in the dataset,
or in the construction of the minimum wage index are then able to produce con￿ icting
estimates. A clear example is the endless debate among Card and Krueger and Neumark
and Wascher about the disemployment e⁄ect of the 1992 increase in New Jersey￿ s minimum
wage. The policy had been scheduled and announced in the early 1990, two years before the
8See Flinn (2006) for an empirical analysis of the e⁄ect of the minimum wage on search e⁄ort.
5actual change. The advance announcement allowed Card and Krueger to collect data pre
and post the minimum wage variation, but it also allowed ￿rms and workers to adjust their
behavior. It is likely that most of the employment e⁄ect had already occurred by 1992 and
the reaction to the actual increase in the minimum wage was small.9 In this case, estimates
may be not robust to minor variations in the data or in the econometric strategy.
3 The role of expectations
The role of expectations in shaping the behavior of economic agents is well documented
and has been extensively used to understand a variety of situations in which speculation
about the future is a crucial factor in determining current action. The theory of rational
expectations was ￿rst proposed by John F. Muth in the early sixties and, in 1995, Robert
E. Jr. Lucas won a Nobel prize for his studies on expectations and monetary policy.
It is widely recognized that the e⁄ect of a policy depends on agents￿expectations. The
"policy ine⁄ectiveness proposition" by Lucas (1972) states the neutrality of economic policies
that have their e⁄ects solely by inducing forecast errors. But also policies that operate
by a⁄ecting incentives have to take into account agents￿expectations. For instance, the
permanent income theory of consumption predicts that a tax-cut is bond to have only a
marginal e⁄ect on consumption if agents expect it to be temporary.
Despite the acknowledged importance of expectations in economics, they have not been
introduced in the analysis of the minimum wage policy. This is surprising, especially because
variations in the minimum wage are often scheduled and announced in advance. Table 1
shows that in many countries the minimum wage is revised on a regular basis, typically
once a year.10 The frequency of adjustment is ￿xed by law, when the minimum wage is
statutory, or by collective contracts, if the minimum wage is negotiated. Also, the criteria
guiding the minimum wage revision are often stated by law. This is the case in Belgium,
Luxemburg, Netherlands, France, Portugal, Spain, Canada and other countries, where the
minimum wage is updated according to in￿ ation, or the level of average wages, productivity,
or other indicators.11
In the light of these features, the minimum wage policy cannot be considered an unpre-
dictable shock. Agents operating in the labor market have the possibility and the incentive
to form expectations about the timing and the magnitude of future minimum wage changes,
since the pro￿tability of an employment relationship depends also on future wages. Expected
variations in the minimum wage a⁄ect the current value of a job and, in turn, the job cre-
ation and job destruction decisions. Then, when the minimum wage actually increases, the
employment adjustment will be small because it has been partly anticipated.
Note that in order for expectations to play a role we need to assume some form of rigidities
in the market. In a perfectly competitive market, an increase in the minimum wage always
9It is not possible to test for the role of expectations on the New Jersey case study due to the lack of data
preceding 1990.
10The updating process concerns the nominal minimum wage. The real minimum wage varies continuously
due to in￿ ation and these variations may be expected or not. Given that in the past two decades in￿ ation has
been relatively low and stable, we argue that the real minimum wage changes were predictable and expected.
In the model, we abstract from changes caused only by in￿ ation because they are marginal and not likely to
signi￿cantly a⁄ect agents￿behavior.
11Source: ILO database on the minimum wage policy.
6implies a fall in employment at the time of the policy ￿regardless of expectations ￿because
labor demand and labor supply depends only on current prices and productivity. Instead,
with matching frictions a ￿rm￿ s current optimization problem depends also on future values
and expectations. At the time the policy becomes expected it is optimal to reduce job
in￿ ows, since those worker will cost more in the future. It is also optimal to decrease the
employment stock and destroy jobs that were formerly productive, even though the current
net value of the wage is still low and the current net value of the match ￿productivity minus
wage ￿is positive. Some of the matches that are expected to become unproductive in the
future are separated in advance because, due to frictions, it takes time to ￿nd a new worker
and replace the former one.
4 The model
The model is built to mimic the labor market of low wage workers, i.e. the wage is ￿xed at
the minimum wage level. The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions,
heterogeneous stochastic matches and endogenous separations.
Frictions are summarized by the matching function m(v;u), with constant returns to





v , respectively. Let￿ s call ￿ the market tightness, i.e. the ratio between vacancies
over unemployment. The higher is ￿, the higher is the probability to ￿nd a job for a worker,
p, and the lower is the probability to meet a worker for a ￿rm, q.
The productivity of a match is a stochastic draw, x, from a known probability distribution
H (x), at the time of the meeting. Observing x, the ￿rm-worker pair decides whether or not
to form the match and start production. Low realization of x may be rejected because of
the prospect of a better job match in the future. The minimum level of productivity such
that the match is formed is called hiring standard, a.
Match productivity x can be hit by a shock with frequency ￿ and the new productivity
level is drawn from H (x), over the support [xl;xu]. Job separations occurs if the new
productivity draw is lower than the productivity threshold d. A match may also be destroyed
when the minimum wage increases and, at the new wage, the job is no more pro￿table. In
case of separation, a ￿ring tax F is paid by the ￿rm.12 Note that, due to the separation cost
F, the productivity threshold d is lower than the hiring standard a.
Firms know that the minimum wage may increase to w2, and assign probability ￿ to this
event.13 Over time expectations are updated and ￿ changes accordingly. We distinguish
three phases. Initially, state 0, agents do not expect the minimum wage to rise, the wage is
12Employment protection legislation takes several forms in di⁄erent countries: requirement to give a notice
period to the worker before dismissal becomes e⁄ective; severance payments; possibility for the worker to
contest the dismissal in front of a court; etc. Most of the literature considers only the cost incurred by
the ￿rm and paid outside of the match, which can be modeled as a tax. This is necessary in order for the
employment protection legislation not to be overruled by an appropriate wage contract. In this model wages
are exogenously ￿xed at the minimum wage level, therefore it is irrelevant whether the cost F is transferred
to the worker or paid to a third part.
13Uncertainty pertains the occurrence of the increase in the minimum wage, while the magnitude is known.
Allowing for uncertainty in the magnitude would not a⁄ect the results, as long as agents are risk neutral
and expectations are rational, i.e. contain no systematic errors. As a sketch of proof, note that the future
7at level w1 and the expectation parameter is ￿0 = 0.14 In state 1 the subjective probability
￿ increases to ￿1 > ￿0, the wage is still w1 but it is expected to increase in the future with
a positive probability ￿1. In the real world, expectations may be revised due to political
announcements of a future variation in the minimum wage, or due to changes in the economic
situation or in the political support such that the likelihood of an increase in the minimum
wage varies. When the minimum wage actually rises, state 2, the expected event has taken
place, the wage changes to w2 > w1 and ￿2 is set back to zero.15
4.1 Value functions
There is a continuum of identical households with total mass equal to one and a continuum
of identical ￿rms, each one holding one job. Each worker receives the minimum wage w:
Given our assumptions, the value of a ￿lled job in period i reads:16
rJi (x) = x ￿ w1 + ￿
R xu
d [Ji (s) ￿ Ji (x)]dH (s) + ￿H (d)[Vi ￿ F ￿ Ji (x)]
+￿i maxfVi ￿ F ￿ Ji (x);J2 (x) ￿ Ji (x)g i = 0;1
(1)
rJ2 (x) = x ￿ w2 + ￿
Z xu
d
[J2 (s) ￿ J2 (x)]dH (s) + ￿H (d)[V2 ￿ F ￿ J2 (x)] (2)
where w2 > w1, ￿0 = 0, ￿1 > 0.
In each period, a job produces x and costs w; when it is hit by a shock, with arrival rate
￿, its productivity is drawn from H (x) over the support
￿
xl;xu￿
. If the new productivity
is below the threshold d, the job is destroyed, the ￿rm gets a new vacancy V and pays F,
otherwise the job is continued. In state 1, ￿rms know that, with probability ￿1, the minimum
wage will increase to w2 and the value of a job will change to J2 (x). The job is destroyed if
its new value is lower then the ￿ring cost. Note that Ji (x) is decreasing in the wage w and
in the expectation parameter ￿.
The value of a vacancy is:
rVi = ￿k + q (￿)
Z xu
a
[Ji (s) ￿ Vi]dH (s) i = 0;1;2 (3)
where k is the cost of posting a vacancy. The match productivity is drawn from H (x).
Conditional on meeting a worker, with probability q (￿), the match is formed and production
expected wage do not change including uncertainty on the magnitude:
E [wt+1] = E [(1 ￿ ￿)w1 + ￿(w2 + ")]
= (1 ￿ ￿)w1 + ￿w2
where " is a random noise centered around zero.
14Alternatively, we could assume that the initial subjective probability ￿0 is positive, then compare a policy
that does not a⁄ect expectations, ￿1 = ￿0, with a policy that does, ￿1 6= ￿0. The implications of the model do
not qualitatively change as long as ￿1 > ￿0. Setting ￿0 = 0 can be regarded as a normalization. Furthermore,
this allow us to qualify the former policy as unexpected and the latter one as expected.
15State 2 is absorbing, i.e. once the world gets there, it will stay there forever, or as long as a new event
occurs. We are implicitly assuming that agents expect the minimum wage to increase only once and for all.
Alternatively, we could set both ￿0 and ￿2 to a positive, albeit small, value. This would account for the
regular update of the minimum wage policy, without a⁄ecting the subsequent analysis.
16All the value functions presented in this section are in continuous time and at the steady state.
8takes place if the observed productivity is high enough, i.e. x is higher than the hiring
standard a.
Note that, in this simple framework, we abstract from the behavior of workers. We
assume that w is larger than the workers￿outside option, so that they are always willing to
form a match and to continue it.
Firms post vacancies as long as their value is positive. Free entry ensures that, in equi-
librium, the value of a vacant position is zero, i.e. Vi = 0. When a worker and a ￿rm meet,
they observe the match speci￿c productivity x and decide whether or not to form the match.
Given wage rigidity, it could happen that the match is pro￿table for the worker but not for
the employer. Hence, the match is formed only if the ￿rm￿ s surplus, J ￿ V , is positive. The
hiring standard solves J (a) = 0 and gives the lower bound for acceptable matches. Once
the match is formed, the employment protection regulation becomes binding and the ￿rm￿ s
outside option reduces from V to V ￿ F. Therefore a job is destroyed only when its value
falls below ￿F. The continuation decision is taken comparing the current productivity of
the match with the threshold d, where d solve the condition J (d) = ￿F.
4.2 Expected increase in the minimum wage
We de￿ne an increase in the minimum wage as expected if it has been announced or if some
exogenous events ￿ for instance, the party in power changes from the right wing to the
left wing ￿increase the likelihood of a change in the wage policy.17 Recall that there are
three states of the world, characterized by di⁄erent wages w and expectation parameters ￿.
Expectations introduce interdependency among states. In particular, employment decisions
taken in state 1 depends also on the value of matches in state 2.
In the following, we derive the equilibrium conditions and analyze the steady states and
the transitions among states.
4.2.1 Equilibrium conditions
The ￿rm￿ s problem is solved backward, starting from state 2. Substituting the value functions
in state 2, namely equations 2 and 3, into the free entry condition, V2 = 0, the match










17Note that, even if the minimum wage variation has been announced, this does not necessarily imply
certainty about the future change. The evolution of the economic situation or of the political support may
induce the government (or the unions, if the minimum wage is negotiated) to revise the annouced wage
change.
An example is the 1992 increase in the New Jersey￿ s minimum wage up to $5.05 per hour. The policy had
been scheduled in 1990, but the worsening of the New Jersey￿ s economy rose concerns about the potential
adverse impact of a higher minimum wage. The state legislature voted in March 1992 to phase in the planned
increase over two years, but the vote fell just short of the margin required to override a gubernatorial veto,
and the Governor allowed the $5.05 rate to go into e⁄ect on April 1. In the end, the minimum wage increase
took e⁄ect as originally planned, but expectations about it were far from certainty.





(s ￿ d2)dH (s) + ￿F (5)





(s ￿ d2)dH (s) (6)
Let us call conditions 4, 5 and 6 job creation (JC), match formation (MF) and job destruction
(JD), respectively. The solution to the system of three equations gives the hiring standard
a, the job destruction threshold d, and market tightness ￿. It can be shown that a and d are
increasing in w: a higher labor cost makes ￿rms more choosy about forming and continuing
a match. In contrast, ￿ is decreasing w: for any productivity level, the value of a ￿lled job
is lower, less vacancies are posted, and the labor market tightness ￿ diminishes.
In state 1 agents take into account the future variation in the value of the match, therefore
J1 (x) depends on the value of a ￿lled position in state 2. From equation 1, we have:
rJ1 (x) =
(
x ￿ w1 + ￿
R xu
d1 [J1 (s) ￿ J1 (x)]dH (s) ￿ [￿H (d1) + ￿1][F + J1 (x)] if x < d2
x ￿ w1 + ￿
R xu
d1 [J1 (s) ￿ J1 (x)]dH (s) ￿ ￿H (d1)[F + J1 (x)] + ￿1 [J2 (x) ￿ J1 (x)] if x ￿ d2
(7)
Equation 7 is depicted in Figure 1 together with the value function of a job in state 2. The
job value in state 1 is a piecewise function that changes slope at x = d2. The ￿rst segment
pertains to the low productivity matches, x < d2. Those jobs are not pro￿table after the
minimum wage shock and will be destroyed in state 2. The second segment represents the
high productivity matches, x > d2, that are continued after the policy shock.
Note that the value of a job in state 1 is always higher than the respective value in state
2 because, at least in the current period, ￿rms pay a lower wage. Hence the productivity
thresholds a1 and d1 are unambiguously smaller than a2 and d2. The exact location of J1 (x)
depends on the value of the parameters of the model, in particular w1;w2 and F. Figure 1
shows two possible cases: JA
1 (x) and JB
1 (x). In case A the increase in the minimum wage
causes the destruction of newly formed jobs, aA
1 < d2. In case B the initial hiring standard
fully anticipates the future rise in the reservation productivity; only existing matches hit
by negative productivity shocks are at risk of separation, while new jobs are su¢ ciently
productive to survive state 2, aB
1 > d2. It can be proved that J1 (x) falls in case A if the
following condition is satis￿ed:
(r + ￿ + ￿)F < C (8)
where C = w2￿w1+ ￿
r+￿+￿
R d2
d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s)+ ￿
r+￿
hR xu
d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿
R xu
d2 (s ￿ d2)dH (s)
i
.
Intuitively, when the increase in the minimum wage is high with respect to the ￿ring cost
F (case A), it is convenient to form some matches that will be destroyed after the policy
shock, aA
1 < d2,because the actual revenues ￿the lower wage paid to the worker plus the
value of production undertaken in state 1 ￿is higher than the future cost of separation.
Viceversa, when F is high with respect to the minimum wage variation, it is optimal to form
only highly productive matches that will survive the policy shock, aB
1 > d2.18 Regardless of
18See Appendix A for a formal proof.
10the exact position of J1 (x), it is always true that the hiring standard a and the destruction
threshold d are lower in state 1 than in state 2, and market tightness ￿ is higher.
In state 0, agents do not expect the minimum wage to rise, i.e. they assign probability
￿0 = 0 to this event. The value functions in state 0 are equal to the value functions in state
2, except for the wage, which is w1 < w2. The solution of the equilibrium conditions gives
the two productivity thresholds, a0 and d0. They are lower than the respective values in
state 1 and state 2, whereas ￿0 is higher.19
Knowing a, d, ￿, we can compute the steady state unemployment rate:20
ui =
￿H (di)
￿H (di) + ￿iq (￿i)[1 ￿ H (ai)]
i = 0;1;2 (9)
where ￿H (di) is the job destruction rate, de￿ned as the ratio of total job destruction to
employment, and ￿iq (￿i)[1 ￿ H (ai)] is the job ￿nding rate, i.e. the ratio of total job creation
to unemployment. Unemployment is increasing in the job destruction threshold, d, and in
the hiring standard, a, and it is decreasing in market tightness, ￿. It follows that the
unemployment rate is higher in state 1 than in state 0, and it peaks in state 2.
4.2.2 Job ￿ ows and unemployment dynamics
We showed in the previous section that both expectations and the actual rise in the minimum
wage have a negative e⁄ect on the job value of matches for any given productivity level. The
comparison across steady states gives the following:
a0 < a1 < a2
d0 < d1 < d2




u0 < u1 < u2 (10)
Moving from one state to the other the expected labor cost increases, hence a higher pro-
ductivity is required to form ￿higher hiring standard a ￿and to continue a match ￿higher
job destruction threshold d ￿and less vacancies are posted ￿higher market tightness ￿. As
a result, steady state unemployment increases.
How does unemployment move from one steady state to the other? In general, the
dynamics of unemployment is given by the di⁄erence between in￿ ows, job destruction, and
out￿ ows, match formation:
_ u = ￿H (d)(1 ￿ u) ￿ ￿q (￿)[1 ￿ H (a)]u (11)
In steady state the two ￿ ows compensate each other and unemployment stays constant. The
change in expectations and the increase in the wage act as a shock to the value functions, so
that the previous equilibrium parameters ￿a, d, ￿ ￿do not satisfy anymore the equilibrium
conditions JC, MF and JD. To ensure that agents are optimizing also out of the steady state,
19The equilibrium conditions are formally derived in Appendix A.
20Equation 9 is obtained by setting to zero the change in unemployment:
_ u = ￿H (d)(1 ￿ u) ￿ ￿q (￿)[1 ￿ H (a)]u
where ￿H (d)(1 ￿ u) is the job destruction and ￿q (￿)[1 ￿ H (a)]u measures the mass of job created.
11the key parameters have to vary in accordance with the shock. This in turn unbalances
in￿ ows and out￿ ows and unemployment moves out of the steady state.
Consider the transition from state 0 to state 1. The initial values of open and ￿lled
positions are de￿ned by equations 3 and 1 respectively, with w = w1 and ￿ = 0. Jobs
are destroyed at rate ￿H (d0) ￿job destruction rate ￿and new matches are formed at rate
￿0q (￿0)[1 ￿ H (a0)]u0=(1 ￿ u0) ￿job creation rate. Flows are in equilibrium and unemploy-
ment is constant at level u0. When an announcement or a political or economic shock takes
place, expectations move from ￿0 = 0 to ￿1 > 0 and the value functions change to:
rV = ￿k + q (￿)
Z xu
a
[J (s) ￿ V ]dH (s) + _ V (12)
rJ (x) = x ￿ w1 + ￿
R xu
d [J (s) ￿ J (x)]dH (s) + ￿H (d)[V ￿ F ￿ J (x)]
+￿1 maxfV ￿ F ￿ J (x);J2 (x) ￿ J (x)g + _ J
(13)
where _ V and _ J are the expected variations in the valuation of V and J over time. Equilibrium












d + (r + ￿ + ￿)F if J (d) > 0
d + (r + ￿)F + ￿ d2￿d
r+￿+￿ if J (d) < 0 (15)
d = w1 ￿ ￿
￿
1
r + ￿ + ￿
Z d2
d
(s ￿ d)dH (s) + [1 ￿ H (d2)]
d2 ￿ d








(s ￿ d2)dH (s) ￿ rF
Equations (14) to (16) do not depend on the time derivatives _ V and _ J and are identical to
the equilibrium conditions for state 1 derived in Appendix A.21 This means that the key
parameters, a, d and ￿, jump at the new steady state value as soon as the shock occurs and
do not move any more. The only sticky variable is unemployment, u, that adjusts according
to equation 11.
The dynamics of ￿ ows and unemployment are depicted in Figures 2 to 4. On impact,
the job destruction rate rises from ￿H (d0) to f￿H (d1)+ [H (d1) ￿ H (d0)]g. The jump is
triggered by the increase in the job destruction threshold, d, and by the separations of all
matches with productivity in the range d0 ￿ x ￿ d1. Then job destruction drops to ￿H (d1)
till the next shock. The job creation rate decreases from ￿0q (￿0)[1 ￿ H (a0)]u0/(1 ￿ u0) to
￿1q (￿1)[1 ￿ H (a1)]u0/(1 ￿ u0); because of the higher a and the lower ￿. Then, as long as
unemployment increases, job creation rises until it matches the higher job destruction rate
at the new steady state.22
21It is easily showed that the optimizing conditions force the time derivatives _ V and _ J to be equal to zero.
See Pissarides (2000) for a discussion of the out of the steady state dynamics.
22The dynamics of the job ￿nding rate ￿i.e. the ratio between the number of newly formed match and
unemployment, ￿q (￿)[1 ￿ H (a)] ￿ is depicted in Figure 4. The job ￿nding rate does not depend on u,
therefore it jumps down from ￿0q (￿0)[1 ￿ H (a0)] to ￿1q (￿1)[1 ￿ H (a1)] without any transition.
12On impact unemployment also jumps, following the rise in the job destruction ￿ ows, but
does not reach the new steady state level in one step. As long as the job destruction rate
is higher than the job creation rate, the unemployment level increases and it adjusts slowly
to the new steady state level u1.23 This is a well known property of the matching model
(see Pissarides (2000)): frictions imply that unemployment is a predetermined variable and
follows a stable and backward looking process governed by the di⁄erence between the job
creation and the job destruction ￿ ows.
Once the minimum wage actually increases a second transition path starts, from u1 to
u2. The hiring standard and the job destruction thresholds jump to the new steady state
values a2 and d2, and market tightness falls to ￿2. Job ￿ ows follow the same transition path
discussed before and unemployment gradually rises.
The disemployment e⁄ect of the minimum wage is distributed over time: a ￿rst rise
occurs between the announcement and the actual change
￿uex￿ante = u1 ￿ u0 (17)
a second increase takes place following the actual variation in the minimum wage
￿uex￿post = u2 ￿ u1 (18)
4.3 Unexpected increase in the minimum wage
A minimum wage variation is unexpected if agents never assign a positive probability to the
event. When the minimum wage actually increases, the economy moves directly from state
0 to state 2.
Value functions and equilibrium conditions have been discussed in the previous sections.
In this case we do not observe state 1 ￿the state with positive expectations about a change
in the minimum wage ￿but we can use the results derived for state 0 and state 2. As in the
model with expectations, when the minimum wage increases the job destruction threshold
d and the hiring standard a increase, while market tightness ￿ decreases. Therefore steady
state unemployment increases.
The unemployment dynamics are represented by the dotted line in Figure 2. There is
only one transition, from state 0 to state 1. After the increase in the minimum wage, the
unemployment rises from u0 to u2. The transition path of job ￿ ows and unemployment has
been detailed in the previous section.
Note that, when the increase in the minimum wage is unexpected, the disemployment
e⁄ect takes place only after the actual variation.
￿u = u2 ￿ u0 (19)
23The lenght of transitions depends on the primitive parameters of the model, in particular it depends on
the e¢ ciency of the matching function. At the time the minimum wage actually increases, the transition may
not have ￿nished yet, so that the steady state 1 is never reached. In order to simplify the comparisons among
states, we assume that the steady state 1 is reached before the minimum wage variation occurs. Conclusions
would be qualitatively the same if we allowed for a more general case.
134.4 Comparison
Both expected and unexpected variations in the minimum wage lead to a rise in the unem-
ployment rate. The di⁄erence is in the dynamics.
When the rise in the minimum wage is expected, the disemployment e⁄ect is split between
the ex-ante e⁄ect ￿before the actual change ￿and the ex-post e⁄ect ￿after the actual change.
Instead, when the increase in the minimum wage is unexpected, the disemployment e⁄ect is
concentrated ex-post.
This distinction is not irrelevant when it comes to the empirical estimate of the minimum
wage impact. All the empirical studies have analyzed the ex-post e⁄ect only, therefore
neglecting an important component of the overall disemployment e⁄ect: the anticipation
e⁄ect. Firms anticipate the policy and adjust their behavior in advance so that the ex-post
impact of the minimum wage is smaller. Unemployment increases less, from u1 to u2, and
the jump in job destruction and in the job ￿nding rate is lower:
JD
1 ￿ u
: ￿H (d2) ￿ ￿H (d1) < ￿H (d2) ￿ ￿H (d0) (20)
JC
u
: ￿1q (￿1)[1 ￿ H (a1)] ￿ ￿2q (￿2)[1 ￿ H (a2)] < ￿0q (￿0)[1 ￿ H (a0)]
￿￿2q (￿2)[1 ￿ H (a2)]
(21)
It can be shown that the higher is the likelihood associated to the policy, ￿1, the lower is
the observed e⁄ect on unemployment, job destruction and job creation,24 hence the harder is
to identify the e⁄ect in the data and to get robust estimates. Note that expectations do not
neutralize the disemployment e⁄ect of the minimum wage, but reduce its ex-post magnitude.
In order to obtain a null or even positive employment e⁄ect we would need to include labor
participation or search e⁄ort decisions, but this goes beyond our purposes.25




















@￿1q (￿1)[1 ￿ H (a1)]
@￿1
< 0
25In this model we abstract from workers￿decision about optimal search e⁄ort. When the minimum wage
increases, the value of being employed increases and could induce workers to exert more e⁄ort in searching
for a job with positive e⁄ect on employment. On the other hand, higher minimum wage means also lower
vacancy posting that is detrimental to the search e⁄ort. The net e⁄ect is ambiguous and there is no consensus
on the empirical evidence.
Neumark and Wascher (1995) found a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of the minimum wage on young workers￿
search e⁄ort and used this evidence to explain the weak disemployment e⁄ect found in some studies. On the
other side, Flinn (2006) did not ￿nd signi￿cant support for the minimum wage to rise the contact rates.
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The model presented in Section 4 predicts that the employment e⁄ect of an increase in the
minimum wage is split between ex-ante and ex-post e⁄ect in the case of an expected policy,
while there is only ex-post e⁄ect in the case of an unexpected policy. Testing the model
requires the discrimination among expected and unexpected minimum wage changes. In
general it is not possible to observe individual expectations about policy changes, but the
recent history of Spain provides a useful identi￿cation strategy.
5.1 Institutional framework
The Spanish law provides the minimum wage to be adjusted every half a year, taking into
account the cost of living, the level of wages and incomes in the country, the evolution of pro-
ductivity, and the economic situation. In practice the government sets the interoccupational
minimum wage only once a year by Royal Decree, following a period of consultation with
the most representative trade unions and employers￿associations. The new amount becomes
mandatory from the ￿rst day of each following January. The minimum wage legislation ap-
plies to workers from all occupations, trades and economic sectors. Subminimum wages are
speci￿ed for trainees; subminima cannot be less than 70, 80 and 90% of the inter-profession
minimum wage for the ￿rst, second and third year of validity of the contract. Until 1997 the
government ￿xed two minimum wages: one for adult workers (+18 years old) and another
for workers aged between 16 and 18. The di⁄erence was eliminated in 1998.
This particular setting suggests that minimum wage changes can be foreseen. Further-
more, Spain enjoyed considerable political stability after the death of Franco and the birth
of democracy. From 1977 to now, Spain had four prime ministers only: Adolfo SuÆrez
(centre-right coalition), Felipe GonzÆlez (Spanish Socialist Workers￿Party), JosØ Mar￿a Az-
nar (People￿ s Party), and JosØ Luis Rodr￿guez Zapatero (Socialist Party). Political stability
may have facilitated the formation of clear expectations.
The prediction of minimum wage variations has been particularly simple during the
second Aznar￿ s mandate. JosØ Mar￿a Aznar L￿pez served as the President of the Government
of Spain from 1996 to 2004. In 1997 the government promoted a process of dialogue with
trade unions and employers￿organizations for the preparation of labor market reforms. The
concertation led to three agreements: Interprofessional Agreement on Collective Bargaining,
Interprofessional Agreement on Employment Stability, and Interprofessional Agreement to
Fill the Gaps in Collective Bargaining.26 With respect to the wage setting, unions accepted
wage moderation in exchange for a limitation in the use of temporary contracts. In the
following period the minimum wage rose by two per cent each year, according to the in￿ ation
target. Taking into account the real in￿ ation, this meant a slight but persistent decrease in
the real minimum wage.27
Instead the increase in the minimum wage in July 2004 was largely unexpected, in the
timing and in the magnitude. On 14th March of 2004, three days after a terrorist attack,
26See Molina Romo (2003, 2004) for an analysis of the concertation process in Spain in the 90s.
27The lowering of the real minimum wage was not a new experience for Spain. Table 3 shows that also
before the Aznar government, despite the high increase in the nominal minimum wage, the real one was
most of the time decreasing or roughly stable, due to high in￿ ation rates in the 80s. The novelty was in the
concertation process and therefore the broad agreement and widespread knowledge of this plan.
15the Spanish Socialist Party won the election and JosØ Luis Rodr￿guez Zapatero became the
new premier. An important point in the socialist agenda was the increase in the minimum
wage up to 600 euros monthly ￿the minimum wage was set at 460.50 euros in the beginning
of 2004 ￿by the end of the mandate. Soon after the election, Zapatero announced a rise in
the minimum wage by 6.6%, mandatory from the beginning of July.
The Economist called Zapatero "the unexpected prime minister", speculating that his
success was related, at least partly, to the bombing in Madrid. On the 11th March of 2004
three trains exploded in Atocha Station. The explosions killed 191 people and 1,500 were
wounded. It has been the largest peacetime attacks in Spanish history. Spain was involved
in Iraq war as an U.S. ally and has been threatened reprisals by Bin Laden in the October
of 2003. Nevertheless, the conservative government pointed in the direction of ETA ￿the
Basque separatist group that seeks the independence of the Basque country ￿as the author
of the attack. This claim was not taken back despite many hints in the direction of Al-Qaeda.
By the afternoon of the 13th of March it was already quite clear that the attack was executed
by an Islamic terrorist group. Blaming ETA against the facts turned out to be a serious
mistake for the right wing. The government was accused of manipulating information about
the real authorship of the attacks to avoid the consequences of public anger at a bombing
motivated by its foreign policy. Zapatero himself repeatedly accused the Popular Party of
lying about those who were responsible for the attacks and promised to withdraw Spanish
troops from Iraq, in case he was elected.
Before the bombing opinion polls pointed in favor of the People￿ s Party (PP), but in
a few days the election result was reversed. In a recent paper Montalvo(2006) identi￿es
the e⁄ect of the terrorist attacks on the election result, comparing the voting behavior of
the presential voters with respect to the absentee voters, i.e. the citizens abroad. The
￿rst group voted on the 14th of March, knowing about the terrorist attacks. The latter
group was allowed to start voting from the 2nd of March, so that they could have voted
before the bombing. A di⁄erence in di⁄erence estimator is constructed using data on voting
results of Congressional elections from 1993 to 2004. The estimate shows that the terrorist
attack reduced the support for the PP by approximately 5 percentage point. Therefore, the
election of the Socialist Party was an unexpected event. It follows that the July-2004 rise
in the minimum wage was also unexpected, as opposed to the widely expected variation
previously carried out by the conservatory party.28
To summarize, the Spanish case provides us with two types of minimum wage changes:
expected and unexpected. Now we can test the prediction of the model concerning the role
of expectations in shaping the disemployment e⁄ect.
5.2 Data
The data used in the empirical investigation come from the Economically Active Population
Survey (EPA) 2000-2006.29 EPA is a rotating quarterly survey carried out by the Spanish
National Statistical Institution. Its main goal is to reveal the characteristics of the popula-
tion living in the Spanish national territory. The survey￿ s rotation scheme implies that every
28Immidiately after, the election, the July-2004 rise in the minimum wage became expected. In the empirical
model we allow for an anticipation e⁄ect of this policy.
29INE, Enquesta de Poblaci￿n Activa, Anonimizado de Flujos, 2000-2006.
16new rotation group stays in the survey for six consecutive quarters; hence we can follow the
employment story of individuals for one year and a half.
The sample size consists of about 64,000 households with approximately 150,000 indi-
viduals aged sixteen or more. The questionnaire is submitted to a single household respon-
dent who answers for all the persons living in the household. The household respondent
may change between successive interviews. This allows low attrition rate but increases the
measurement error, especially in retrospective questions. The questionnaire is composed of
several sections asking about educational attainment and working status of each individual
in the household. The reference period for most questions is the week before the interview.
The ￿rst quarter of each year also includes retrospective questions about the working status
of the individual one year earlier. There are no information about earnings.
Table 3 shows that labor market participation is relatively low in Spain: over the 2000-
2006 period only around 50 per cent of the Spanish labor force was employed, and 7 per cent
was unemployed. Yet, participation rate was increasing from 0.53 in 2000 to 0.64 in 2006,
driven from the higher participation of the youth, whose employment rate augmented from
34.5 to 42.2 per cent. Unemployment followed a decreasing trend and ￿ ows into employment
almost doubled over the period. On the other side employment stability lowered and sepa-
rations increased. Note that the share of temporary workers is considerably high in Spain:
almost 70 per cent of the youth and 30 per cent of the adults are employed under ￿xed-term
contracts.
5.3 Econometric speci￿cation
Three sets of equations are estimated. First, we analyze the e⁄ect of the minimum wage
variation on the probability of being employed. Then, following Portugal and Cardoso (2006),
we concentrate on ￿ ows in and out of employment, and we relate them to the change in the
minimum wage. The analysis of the dynamics of ￿ ows allows us to identify the exact source
for employment changes and to better appreciate the role of the minimum wage even when
the net disemployment e⁄ect is small.
Exploiting the structure of the survey we can match 5/6 of the individuals in any two
consecutive quarters and check whether they changed status or not. We only distinguish
between employment and non-employment, pooling together unemployed workers and in-
active individuals. The reason is that variations in employment gives a better measure of
the e⁄ect of the minimum wage than changes in the unemployment stock. If the minimum
wage reduces job opportunities, some individuals may give up looking for jobs, and hence
not be counted as unemployed.30 Then the harm of the job opportunities is not accounted
by the unemployment measure. On the other side, some people may exit inactivity and
start looking for better paid jobs, increasing unemployment and overestimating the harm
of the minimum wage. Furthermore, the statistics on unemployment rely on a number of
arbitrary choices. According to the ILO de￿nition, the unemployed comprise those persons
who were (1) without work during the reference week, (2) currently available for work, (3)
actively seeking work. Hence, the distinction between unemployment and inactivity relies
on arguable criteria, such as the de￿nition of active search and the four weeks job-search
30This is particularly true for young individuals. Enrolling in education is an alternative to unemployment
for them, therefore blurring the line between unemployment and inactivity (Neumark and Wascher, 2004).
17period.31
Our dependent variables are the employment status and the ￿ ows out of and into em-
ployment: (i) ye
it is equal to 1 if individual i is employed in quarter t, 0 otherwise; (ii) yout
it
is equal to 1 if individual i is employed in quarter t and non-employed in quarter t + 1, and
it is set at 0 if he/she is employed both at t and t + 1; (iii) yin
it is equal to 1 if individual
i is non-employed in quarter t and employed in quarter t + 1, and it is set at 0 if he/she
is non-employed both at t and t + 1. We use the same econometric framework, probit, to
model the employed status and the ￿ ows:
Pr(ye




























where ￿(￿) is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal, Qit;Zit and Wit are the
matrices of covariates (minimum wage variation, age, gender, education, time e⁄ect, etc.).
Note that Pr(ye










corresponds to the job destruction rate to employment, ￿H (d), and to the
job ￿nding rate, ￿q (￿)[1 ￿ H (a)], respectively.
The key variable is the variation ￿ quarter to quarter ￿ in the real minimum wage.
The variable UMW identi￿es the unexpected increase in July 2004. All the other variations
occurred to the real minimum wage are considered as expected, including those related to
in￿ ation, and are accounted by EMW. In the regressions on ￿ ows the on impact e⁄ect of
UMW and EMW is measured as the e⁄ect of the policy on the ￿ ow occurring between the
quarter of the policy and the following quarter. Accordingly, in the employment regression
the on impact e⁄ect of UMW and EMW is estimated at the quarter following the respective
policy, as a result of the changes in ￿ ows.32
The minimum wage policy does not a⁄ect all workers, but only those who are low-earners,
typically young, unexperienced workers.33 Accordingly, we identify the treatment group with
the young, while the control group is composed by the adult. A proportional di⁄erence in
di⁄erence approach is applied to estimate the following regression. For brevity we omit the
subscript it.
Pr(y = 1) = ￿(￿0 + ￿1Y + ￿2Y ￿ UMW + ￿3Y ￿ EMW + T￿ + X￿ + ") (25)
where Y is a dummy equal to 1 when the individual is aged 16-24 and 0 if older;34 T is
a set of time dummies, one for each quarter; and X is a set of covariates, including gender,
31A comprehensive report of the reasons underlying the choice of employment as a better measure of the
minimum wage harm is given in Brown et al. (1982). See also Brandolini, Cipollone and Viviano (2006) for
a discussion of the ILO unemployment de￿nition.
32In practice, in the ￿ ow equations the variable UMW is positive in correspondence with the ￿ ow from
2004:Q3 to 2004:Q4 and zero otherwise. In the employment equation, UMW is positive in quarter 2004:Q4.
33Empirical studies show that the elasticity of employment to the minimum wage is negligible, except
perhaps for youth employment. For example, the OECD (1998) cross-country study ￿nds that a rise of 10%
in the minimum wage entails a fall of between 2% and 4% in employment among those aged less than 20. The
impact is negative, but close to zero, also for individuals between 20 and 24 years old. On the other hand,
the minimum wage has no e⁄ect on the employment of older workers.
34We consider only workers aged up to 54 years. Older workers are not included in order to minimize the
contamination of results generated by early retirement decisions.
18education, and the region of residence. Due to the nonlinearity of the probit model, the
treatment e⁄ect is not equal to the marginal e⁄ect of the interacted term, but it has to be
computed as the incremental e⁄ect of the coe¢ cient of the interaction term.35 In particular,
the e⁄ect of the unexpected increase in the minimum wage on the treated group is com-
puted as ￿(￿0 + ￿1Y + ￿2Y ￿ UMW + T2￿2 + X￿ + ") ￿ ￿(￿0 + ￿1Y + T2￿2 + X￿ + ");
while ￿(￿0 + ￿1Y + ￿3Y ￿ EMW + T3￿3 + X￿ + ") ￿ ￿(￿0 + ￿1Y + T3￿3 + X￿ + ") mea-
sures the e⁄ect of an expected policy.
The model has implication for the timing of the treatment e⁄ect: an expected change
in the minimum wage a⁄ects employment both before and after the actual variation, while
an unexpected variation has e⁄ect only after the policy is implemented. The dynamics is
introduced in equation 25 including pre and post e⁄ects:
Pr(y = 1) = ￿
￿
￿0 + ￿1Y + ￿2Y ￿ UMW + ￿1Y ￿ UMW￿pre + ￿2Y ￿ UMW￿post
+￿3Y ￿ EMW + ￿3Y ￿ EMW￿pre + ￿4Y ￿ EMW￿post + T￿ + X￿ + "
￿
(26)
where Y ￿UMW￿pre and Y ￿EMW￿pre accounts, respectively, for the impact of the unexpected
and expected changes in the minimum wage in the period preceding the policy, and Y ￿
UMW￿post and Y ￿ EMW￿post accounts for the impact in the following period.
The recent empirical literature (see Neumark and Wascher, 2007) stresses the importance
of including lagged e⁄ects of the minimum wage arguing that it may take time to adjust to
policy changes. In addition, we include the anticipation e⁄ect.36 An issue is the setting of
the length of the dynamics. If a short length is chosen, it may miss part of the story, while
if too long, it may capture events di⁄erent from the policy under consideration. Therefore
equation 26 is estimated using di⁄erent lengths, from 0 to 2 quarters.37
The employment out￿ ows regressions are replicated also focusing on temporary or per-
manent workers separately. The Spanish labor market is characterized by the coexistence
of two types of employment contracts: ￿xed-term and open-ended contracts. The former
are associated with low employment protection, whereas the latter are strongly protected
by high separation costs and just-cause standard. An increase in the cost of labor is likely
to a⁄ect the two groups of workers in a di⁄erent way. Firms are likely to adjust the work-
force dismissing temporary workers, instead of paying ￿ring costs to terminate permanent
contracts.
5.4 Econometric issues
The main concern in a di⁄erence in di⁄erence approach is the choice of proper treatment and
control groups. Unfortunately EPA does not provide information about earnings, therefore
we cannot precisely disentangle the low wage workers. Instead we exploit information from
35Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004) are the ￿rst to stress that the marginal e⁄ect of the
interacted term cannot be interpreted as the treatment e⁄ect in nonlinear models. The correct treatment
e⁄ect is computed in Puhani (2008).
36Due to the frequency of the policies, it is not possible to estimate a set of separate dynamic e⁄ects at
each pre and post period - i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4 quarters before the policy and 1, 2, 3, 4 quarters after - because those
would systematically overlap giving rise to multicollinearity. For instance, EMW￿pre1 sistematically overlap
with EMW￿post3. Therefore we estimate an average pre and post e⁄ect over a certain number of quarters.
37Longer lengths have also been estimated, but they are only weakly identi￿ed due to the overlapping
between pre and post e⁄ects.
19the Wage Structure Survey. Figure 5 reports the annual average earnings of Spanish workers
in 2002 computed by age, gender, and educational attainments. Young workers receive
signi￿cantly lower wages, 9,686.12 euros whereas the overall average is 19,802.45 euros. This
supports the traditional comparison between young and adult individuals. On the other
side, the 2002 annual minimum wage was set at 6,190.80 euros and among the young there
are also high or medium wage earners who are not a⁄ected by the minimum wage change.
Young workers always get lower wages than adults, especially if they are female and low
educated (primary education or junior high school). Therefore several speci￿cations have
been estimated: (i) young versus adults; (ii) young females versus adult females; (iii) young
with low education versus adult with low education.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the adults are a good control group. The em-
ployment experience of young and adult individuals is likely to be di⁄erent beyond the wage
policy, in particular the seasonal dynamics are more marked for the young. Therefore, we
include controls for young speci￿c seasonality in all speci￿cations.38 In a fourth speci￿cation,
the control group is re￿ned by limiting to young adults, i.e. individuals aged between 25 and
34 years old.
Another issue is the de￿nition of changes in the minimum wage. Table 2 shows that during
Aznar￿ s mandate, the real minimum wage moved very little, whereas it increased signi￿cantly
when Zapatero came into power. We may expect the marginal impact of an increase in the
minimum wage to be di⁄erent in the two periods, because of nonlinearity in the e⁄ects of the
policy on employment.39 Since the variable EMW includes both small (Aznar period) and
large (Zapatero period) variations in the minimum wage, estimates could be biased. In order
to account for the nonlinearity, all estimates have been replicated substituting EMW with
ZMW. The latter variable considers as expected variations only the substantial increases in
the minimum wage occurred in the ￿rst quarter of 2005, 2006 and 2007. This means that
we are assuming that the small movements arranged by the right wing or due uniquely to
in￿ ation have no e⁄ect on employment nor ￿ ows.40
6 Empirical results
Marginal e⁄ects of a ten percent increase in the minimum wage on the average individual are
shown in Tables 4 to 11; standard errors are clustered over time and region.41 Each table is
divided into four panels, one for each de￿nition of treatment and control groups: (i) young
versus adults; (ii) young females versus adult females; (iii) young with low education versus
adult with low education; (iv) young versus young adults. The ￿rst column includes only
the contemporaneous e⁄ect of the minimum wage, the dynamics are added in column (2) to
(5). The length of the dynamic e⁄ect is set at 1 and 2 quarters in (2) and (3) respectively.
In order to avoid the overlapping between EMW￿pre2 and EMW￿post2, the speci￿cation in
38Young speci￿c seasonality is accounted by a set of dummies, Y Qi with i = 1;::;4, that are equal to 1 if
the individual is young in quarter i and 0 otherwise.
39Card and Krueger (1995) argue that only substantial variation in the minimum wage are likely to a⁄ect
employment, therefore small variations should not be used in empirical analysis.
40Note that the estimate of equation 25 does not su⁄er from inconsistency of standard errors because the
treatment, i.e. the minimum wage variation, is not serially correlated. See Bertrand, Du￿ o, and Mullainathan
(2004).
41Estimates for the full set of regressors are not included here but available upon request.
20column (4) accounts for 1 quarter ex-ante e⁄ect and 2 quarters ex-post e⁄ect, while the
lengths of the ex-ante and ex-post dynamics are, respectively, 2 and 1 quarters in column
(5).
As anticipated in the previous Section, for each speci￿cation two regressions have been
estimated: using EMW as the expected-policy variable (Tables 4, 6, 10), and using ZMW
(Tables 5, 7, 8, 9, 11). In the following, we discuss the results of the latter regression.
Estimates of the former one are qualitatively similar.
The in￿ uence of expectations on the disemployment e⁄ect is identi￿ed comparing the
change in ￿ ows and employment probability preceding unexpected and expected variations
in the minimum wage.
6.1 Employment probability
We start with employment probability. Our model predicts a decrease in employment at the
time of the minimum wage increase. Furthermore transitions are expected in the following
period and, if the policy is expected, in the preceding quarters.
Main results are reported in Table 5. We control for time e⁄ects, young seasonality,
region, gender, marital status and education.
When we use the broader de￿nition of the control groups, in the ￿rst three panels, we do
not get any signi￿cant coe¢ cient. The minimum wage policy seems not to have any impact
nor dynamic e⁄ect on employment, regardless of expectations. However signi￿cant results
are obtained once we restrict the sample to individual aged less than 35. The magnitude
of the coe¢ cients and their precision increase in the last panel, young versus young adult.
This is not surprising since the control group is now closer to the treated; and the e⁄ect of
the policy is not blurred by the di⁄erences between young and adults.
With regard to the expected policies, ZMW, we ￿nd a negative employment e⁄ect on
impact and along time. A 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage decreases employment
probability by around 4.9 per cent on impact. The magnitude of the dynamic e⁄ects depends
on the speci￿cation.
The estimates in column (2) give signi￿cant pre and post 1 quarter e⁄ects of 4.5 and 7.1
per cent, respectively. When the length is extended to two quarters, column (3), both e⁄ects
decreases and the ex-ante e⁄ect becomes only marginally signi￿cant (pvalue: 12%). The
lower precision and magnitude of ZMW￿pre2 could be due either to the confounding e⁄ect of
ZMW￿post2 or to the shorter length of the ex-ante dynamics. In the former case, shortening
the ex-post e⁄ect to ZMW￿post1 (column (5)) should result in a higher and signi￿cant coe¢ -
cient for ZMW￿pre2. In the latter, the correct speci￿cation would correspond to column (4)
and we would observe a signi￿cant ZMW￿pre1 and an increase in ZMW￿post2 with respect
to column (3). The results in column (4) and column (5) contradict the confounding e⁄ect
and support the idea of a short anticipation e⁄ect. Estimates in column (4) shows that the
employment fall by 4.7 per cent in the quarter preceding the policy, and by 6.7 per cent in
the following two quarters. The e⁄ects of the unexpected policy are mostly negative but
never statistically signi￿cant.
Note that all the estimated e⁄ects are measured with respect to the pre-expectations
period, state 0 in the model. This means that the e⁄ects are not additive but one should
read, for instance, results in column (4) as:
21￿ ex-ante e⁄ect: before the actual minimum wage policy employment decreases by 4.7
per cent
￿ on impact e⁄ect: at the time of the policy employment probability is lowered by 4.9
per cent with respect to state 0, i.e. the additional on impact e⁄ect is 0.2 per cent
￿ ex-post e⁄ect: after the policy employment probability is 6.7 percentage point lower,
i.e. the additional ex-post e⁄ect is 1.8 per cent.
Applying the traditional approach to these data, one would estimate the variation in
employment probability from the period just before the policy to the following period. Then,
the estimated on impact plus ex-post e⁄ect would be 2 per cent, whereas the true overall
e⁄ect is 6.7 per cent.42
6.2 Flows out of employment
Regressions in Tables 6 and 7 compare the ￿ ows out of employment following expected
and unexpected changes in the minimum wage, for the treatment and the control group.
All speci￿cations control for time e⁄ects, young speci￿c seasonality, region, gender, marital
status, education, contract type, working day, sector, occupation and whether the individual
attended any courses (education or training) during the last month. Results are similar in
the two tables; we will focus on Table 7 only, comparing UMW with ZMW. Following the
same reasoning outlined in the previous Section, we can show that the best speci￿cation of
the dynamics corresponds to column (4).
The upper panel shows results for young versus adult persons. In line with the model
prediction, the estimated on impact e⁄ect of the increase in the minimum wage is signi￿cantly
positive for both expected and unexpected policies. A 10 per cent unexpected increase in
the minimum wage is associated with an increase in job separation probability by 2.4 per
cent, while the e⁄ect is around 5.7 per cent in case if an expected change. Furthermore, the
expected policies have signi￿cant ex-ante and ex-post e⁄ects with magnitude, respectively,
of 3.9 and 4.9 percentage points. The positive di⁄erence between the on impact and ex-post
e⁄ect corresponds to the spike in job destruction described in the model.
Regressions in the second panel compare young females with adult females. Previous
results are con￿rmed: the on impact e⁄ect is positive and strongly signi￿cant for both
policies, around 4 per cent; and ZMW displays dynamics of similar magnitude. Estimates in
the third panel, young with low education versus adult with low education, are still positive
but most of the on impact e⁄ect of UMW is no longer signi￿cant.
The last panel, young versus young adults, gives results similar to the ￿rst panel. The on
impact e⁄ects of UMW and ZMW are, respectively, 3 and 5.6 percentage points; the expected
policy is associated with a signi￿cant ex-ante e⁄ect, 4.1, and ex-post e⁄ect, 5.4. Ignoring
the anticipation e⁄ect, the overall disemployment e⁄ect would be 1.3 instead than 5.4 per
42Actually, the estimated on impact plus ex-post e⁄ect could di⁄er from 2 per cent, due to the underlying
misspeci￿cation. The di⁄erence in di⁄erence approach is based on the common trend hypothesis, i.e. the
treatment and the control group are assumed to follow the same trend before the treatment takes place. Hence,
if there is an ex-ante e⁄ect, the two groups would divert even before the treatment takes place violating the
common trend hypothesis.
22cent. Surprisingly the unexpected policy is found to have a negative ex-post e⁄ect, but the
coe¢ cient is small, 1.3 per cent, and marginally signi￿cant.
Tables 8 and 9 report estimates associated with ￿ ows out of temporary and permanent
employment. Estimates show that the increase in job separations found in Table 7 is led by
the ￿ ows out of temporary employment, while permanent workers are not a⁄ected by the
minimum wage policy.43 The probability of losing a temporary job for young workers as
opposed to adults increases by 4.2 per cent at the time of an unexpected policy and by 7
per cent at the time of an expected policy. The anticipation e⁄ect of ZMW is statistically
and economically signi￿cant, with magnitude 4.7 per cent; the ex-post e⁄ect amounts to
6.3 percentage points. Findings are robust to di⁄erent speci￿cations of the treatment and
control groups.
All regressions includes several control variables. Time and regional dummies are mostly
signi￿cant. Young workers are more likely to separate; their probability to exit employment
is 1 to 3 per cent higher than adults. Being female increases this probability by another 2
per cent. The characteristics of the employment relationship also matters: part time workers
are associated with higher mobility and, not surprisingly, temporary contracts entail greater
separation rates. On the other side, education reduces job exit. Both positive and negative
e⁄ects are somewhat stronger for temporary workers, and weaker for permanent ones.
6.3 Flows into employment
According to the model, higher labor cost should lead to lower ￿ ows into employment, but
estimates in Table 11 are often not signi￿cant.
The on impact e⁄ect of both expected and unexpected policies is statistically null in
most speci￿cation. In the upper panels, young versus adults and young females versus adult
females, the coe¢ cient associated with UMW is positive and signi￿cant at 10 per cent level in
columns (1) and (2), but the e⁄ect fades away when more dynamics is added and it is never
signi￿cant in the lower panels. These ￿ndings help explaining the not signi￿cant employment
e⁄ect in Section 6.1. The unexpected policy had a positive impact on job destruction, but
it was counterbalanced by stable or rising in￿ ows.
The length of the dynamics is not as clear as in the previous regressions. The coe¢ cients
associated with ZMW￿pre and ZMW￿post are mostly signi￿cant when controlling for 1quarter
pre and post e⁄ects. Extending the length of the dynamics, the ex-post e⁄ect decreases and
the ex-ante e⁄ect loses signi￿cativity, as in the regressions on employment probability and
out￿ ows. The results in column (5) contradict the confounding hypothesis, i.e. the lower
precision and magnitude of ZMW￿pre2 is not due to the overlap with ZMW￿post2, for the same
reason discussed before. On the other side, shortening the length of the ex-ante dynamics
(column (4)) leads to results very similar to column (2). These results, together with the
lack of signi￿cativity of the on impact e⁄ect, suggest that dynamic e⁄ects are relatively short
43The di⁄erent e⁄ect of the minimum wage policy on workers with di⁄erent employment contract cannot be
entirely traced back to the role of ￿ring costs. On one side, employment protection may prevent permanent
workers to be dismissed by increasing the adjustment cost with respect to temporary workers. The coun-
terbalancing e⁄ect of EPL on the disemployment impact of the minimum wage is claimed also by Neumark
and Wascher (2004). On the other side, the productivity distribution may di⁄er: temporary jobs may be, on
average, less productive, hence a higher share would fall under the job destruction threshold.
23and concentrated ex-post. Depending on the de￿nition of the treatment and control group,
the overall e⁄ect on in￿ ows ranges between -4.6 and -5.7 percentage points.
All speci￿cations control for gender, education, time e⁄ect, region, search activity, last
sector of occupation and last job. Not surprisingly, the young have greater probability to
enter a job. Females are associated to lower in￿ ows by 6 per cent. Adopting and active
method of search ￿such as inquiring the job centre, or private employment agencies, con-
tacting directly employers, etc. ￿increase the probability of ￿nding a job. Education has a
positive e⁄ect as well.
6.4 Discussing the results
We claim the disemployment e⁄ect of the minimum wage to have di⁄erent dynamics e⁄ects
depending on whether it is expected or not. In particular, our model predicts: (i) expected
policies have an ex-ante e⁄ect on employment and ￿ ows; (ii) the on impact plus ex-post e⁄ect
underestimate the overall employment e⁄ect of expected policies; (iii) the ex-post e⁄ect is
lower the higher are expectations.
Our results chie￿ y con￿rm the model. The anticipation e⁄ect is mostly signi￿cant when
associated to expected policy and the result is robust to many speci￿cation; while UMW￿pre
is always statistically null. The magnitude of the ex-ante e⁄ect is economically signi￿cant
and comparable to the on impact and ex-post e⁄ect. For instance, let us consider the speci￿-
cation comparing young with young adult: an expected 10 per cent increase in the minimum
wage reduces the employment probability ex-ante by 4.7 per cent, ￿ ows out of employment
increases by 4.1 per cent (by 6.2 per cent when considering ￿ ows out of temporary jobs), job
creation decreases by 2.7 per cent, although the coe¢ cient is not signi￿cant at 10 per cent
level. The ex-post e⁄ects are, respectively, -6.7 per cent, 5.4 per cent (+7.7 for temporary
workers), -4.8 per cent. Hence, failing to account for expectations would lead to an impor-
tant underestimate of the employment e⁄ect of the minimum wage. The overall e⁄ect is
measured by the coe¢ cient of ZMW￿post, whereas the on impact plus ex-post e⁄ect is given
by ZMW￿post ￿ ZMW￿pre. Numerically, in the young versus young adult speci￿cation, this
would mean that:
￿ employment: the overall e⁄ect is a decrease in employment probability by 6.7 per cent;
the on impact plus ex-post e⁄ect amounts to -2 per cent;
￿ out￿ ows: the overall e⁄ect is +5.4; without accounting for expectations, the e⁄ect is
-1.3 per cent (5:4 ￿ 4:1);
￿ in￿ ows: the overall e⁄ect is -4.8; the on impact plus ex-post e⁄ect account for -2.1 per
cent (4:8 ￿ 2:7).
The standard approach would therefore miss most of the employment e⁄ect of the mini-
mum wage policy.
The third prediction is not met by the data: we ￿nd no evidence of larger ex-post e⁄ects
associated to the unexpected policy as opposed to the expected policies. Instead, UMW
has no signi￿cant ex-post e⁄ect on employment, nor on ￿ ows, or only small and marginally
signi￿cant e⁄ects. The lack of impact of the unexpected policy cannot be explained in the
24framework proposed in Section 4. But it has to be stressed that our model abstracts from
the workers￿behavior. A matching model including the workers￿decision about the optimal
search e⁄ort would be able to reproduce these results.44 The rise in the minimum wage
may induce agents to exert more e⁄ort in looking for a better paid job, thus increasing
the e¢ ciency of the match process and counterbalancing the lower vacancy posting. The
evolution of participation rates goes in this direction (Figure 6). Over the period 2001-2004,
activity rate was increasing for both young and adult individuals. The youth￿ s participation
rate was, on average, 47.7 per cent in 2001-2003; then it jumped from 49.2 in 2004 to 52.1
in 2005; whereas the adult￿ s participation rate moved only slightly from 80.6 to 80.9 per
cent. The substantial rise in participation at the beginning of Zapatero mandate suggests
that young individuals reacted to Zapatero election and the rise in the minimum wage by
participating more and more e⁄ectively in the labor market. Higher participation has the
same e⁄ect on ￿ ows and employment than greater search e⁄ort and may account for the lack
of signi￿cant impact of UMW. Instead, the positive e⁄ect on participation is weaker after
2005 and, although it may account for the small e⁄ect of the minimum wage on job creation,
it cannot counterbalance the rise in job destruction and the fall in employment associated
with the expected policies.
7 Conclusion
The empirical literature on minimum wages is characterized by controversial results. It is
far from clear whether this policy has a negative e⁄ect on employment or not. Nor economic
theory provides a clear prediction. This paper contributes to the debate by proposing a
mechanism capable of reconciling con￿ icting ￿ndings. The key ingredient is the introduction
of expectations in the analysis of the minimum wage policy.
The role of expectations in shaping the behavior of economic agents has been extensively
studied in a variety of subject, but never in relation with the minimum wage. In many
countries the law determines the level of the minimum wage and the frequency of its revisions;
often it also ￿xes criteria to be used in updating the minimum wage, such as the dynamics
of prices and productivity. Hence, the minimum wage policy can often been foreseen and
expectations about future changes may a⁄ect employment over time.
We propose a search and matching model enriched by expectations and shows that,
when the change in the minimum wage is expected, the disemployment e⁄ect observed after
the policy is only a part of the overall e⁄ect, and it is smaller the higher is the likelihood
associated with the policy. The e⁄ect of higher future labor costs is partly anticipated by
agents, then employment decreases even before the minimum wage actually increases and
the residual ex-post e⁄ect may be small and hard to identify in the empirical estimates.
Since the literature has considered mainly expected policies, the lack of robustness of the
estimated ex-post disemployment e⁄ect is not surprising.
A clear case of unexpected variation in the minimum wage is the increase operated in
Spain in July 2004 by the newly elected Socialist Party. We use this natural experiment
to test the validity of our model by comparing the e⁄ects of the unexpected policy with
those of the expected policies. The minimum wage variation is allowed to a⁄ect employment
44See for instance the model proposed in Flinn (2006).
25and job ￿ ows both at the time of the policy, before and after the policy. In order to net
out confounding factors, we implement a di⁄erence in di⁄erence approach along several
speci￿cations: young versus adults, young females versus adult females, young with low
education versus adult with low education, young versus young adults.
Our results con￿rm the relevance of the anticipation e⁄ect. The expected changes in
the minimum wage implemented in Spain between 2005 and 2007 had a statistically and
economically signi￿cant ex-ante e⁄ect on employment probability and job destruction, as
opposed to the unexpected policy. The standard approach, ignoring the anticipation e⁄ect,
would lead to a severe underestimate of the overall impact. On the other side, the unexpected
policy had only a minor impact on employment and ￿ ows. Empirical evidence suggest
that young individuals reacted to Zapatero election and the rise in the minimum wage by
participating more and more e⁄ectively in the labor market. The rise in the participation
rate partly counterbalanced the potentially negative e⁄ect of the policy.
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J1(x) is the value of a job with productivity x in state 1 (wage w=w1; expectations φ= φ1) 
J2(x) is the value of a job with productivity x in state 2 (wage w=w2; expectations φ= φ2=0) 
a is the productivity level such that J(x) is null; it is called hiring standard. 
d is the productivity level such that J(x) is equal to –F, the firing cost; it is called job destruction 
threshold. 
The position of J1(x) depends on the value of the primitive parameters. Here, two cases are 
depicted: A and B. When firing costs are low with respect to the minimum wage variation, case A, 
the hiring standard a1 is lower than the job destruction threshold in state 2, d2. Otherwise, case B, 

































The continuous line represents the dynamics of unemployment along state 0, state 1 and state 2 in 
case of an expected change in the minimum wage. 
The discontinuous line depict the dynamics of unemployment along state 0 and state 2 in case of 
an unexpected increase in the minimum wage. 
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The continuous line represents the dynamics of the JD (JC) rate along state 0, state 1 and state 2 in 
case of an expected change in the minimum wage. 
The discontinuous line depict the dynamics of the JD (JC) rate along state 0 and state 2 in case of 
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The continuous line represents the dynamics of the job finding rate along state 0, state 1 and state 
2 in case of an expected change in the minimum wage. 
The discontinuous line depict the dynamics of the job finding rate along state 0 and state 2 in case 
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Figure 5. Wage structure in Spain, 2002. 
 




Figure 6. Labor force participation rate in Spain by age. 
 







Table 1. The minimum wage policy in OECD countries. 
 
 




































At least yearly 
Usually every 12 months 
Twice a year 
Every two years 
When necessary 
Twice a year 




Usually every 3 years 
Not defined  
Not defined 
 
Source: ILO database on the minimum wage policy. 35 
 
Table 2. Evolution of the minimum wage in Spain 
Date of coming 
into effect  Minimum wage  Variation over 
previous MW  CPI 
1  Variation real 
MW 
6-1-1980 136.85  10.2  15.56  -5.36 
6-1-1981 153.98  12.5  14.54  -2.04 
1-1-1982 170.93  11.0  14.41  -3.41 
1-1-1983 193.29  13.1  12.17  0.93 
1-1-1984 208.79  8.0 11.28  -3.28 
1-1-1985 223.40  7.0  8.81  -1.81 
1-1-1986 241.25  8.0  8.79  -0.79 
1-1-1987 253.33  5.0  6.10  -1.1 
1-1-1988 264.69  4.5  4.41  0.09 
1-1-1989 280.55  6.0  6.22  -0.22 
1-1-1990 300.57  7.1  6.99  0.11 
1-1-1991 320.04  6.5  6.18  0.32 
1-1-1992 338.25  5.7  6.55  -0.85 
1-1-1993 351.77  4.0  4.23  -0.23 
1-1-1994 364.03  3.5  5.00  -1.5 
1-1-1995 376.83  3.5  4.77  -1.27 
1-1-1996 390.18  3.5  3.65  -0.15 
1-1-1997 400.45  2.6  2.54  0.06 
1-1-1998 408.93  2.1  1.85  0.25 
1-1-1999 416.32  1.8  1.87  -0.07 
1-1-2000 424.80  2.0  2.92  -0.92 
1-1-2001 433.45  2.0  3.79  -1.79 
1-1-2002 442.20  2.0  2.50  -0.5 
1-1-2003 451.20  2.0  3.75  -1.75 
1-1-2004 460.50  2.0  2.19  -0.19 
7-1-2004 490.80  6.6  2.20  4.4 
1-1-2005 513.00  4.5  1.04  3.46 
1-1-2006 540.90  5.4  4.01  1.39 
1-1-2007 570.60  5.5  2.42  3.08 
 
Source: Minimum wage: Ministerio Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales (BOE); CPI: OECD (MEI). 
1 Values in CPI column shows the percentage change of the CPI between two changes in the minimum wage, so that 
CPI=6.10 in 1/1/1987 is the variation of the price level between 1/1/1986 and 1/1/1987; and CPI=2.20 in 7/1/2004 is 
the variation of the price level between 1/1/2004 and 7/1/2004. 
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Table 3. Composition of the dataset, percentage. 
 2000-2006  2000  2004  2006 
A g e :       
     young (16-24)  13.99  15.82  13.15  12.68 
     adult (25-54)  53.94  52.52  54.25  55.29 
     old (at least 55)  32.06  31.67  32.60  32.03 
Education:      
     primary or lower  37.96  42.89  36.95  32.90 
     secondary or professional  41.99  39.23  42.61  44.76 
     university or higher  20.05  17.88  20.44  22.34 
S t a t u s :       
     employed  50.37  45.68  49.43  58.15 
               temporary
1  32.00 32.08 30.64 34.03 
               permanent
1  68.00 67.92 69.36 65.97 
     unemployed  6.98  7.66  7.24  5.79 
     out of labor force  42.65  46.66  43.33  36.06 
 Young  Adult 
  2000 2005 2000 2005 
Education:      
     primary or lower  9.88  10.53  28.83  15.58 
     secondary or professional  74.75  76.09  45.61  52.93 
     university or higher  15.37  13.39  25.56  31.48 
S t a t u s :       
     employed  32.43  37.56  65.79  72.34 
               temporary
1  69.57 66.73 28.38 28.59 
               permanent
1  30.43 33.27 71.62 71.41 
     unemployed  12.60  10.61  9.87  6.86 
     out of labor force  54.88  51.83  24.26  20.81 
Flows:
 2      
     employment-employment  88.25  84.24  95.91  94.77 
     employment-non employment  11.75  15.76  4.09  5.23 
     nonemployment-nonemployment  91.72  86.48  91.10  84.46 
     nonemployment-employment  8.28  13.52  8.90  15.54 
 
Source: Computation based on INE, Enquesta de Población Activa, Anonimizado de Flujos, 2000-2006. 
Values are computed as percentages over the number of individuals who answered the relative questions. 
1 Share of employed persons under a temporary/permanent contract. 
2 Share of employed (nonemployed) individuals who are employed/nonemployed in the following quarter. 37 
 
Table 4. Employment (UMW vs. EMW), Probit regression model. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult 
young*UMW  -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
  [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.022] [0.023] 
young*EMW  0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 
  [0.022]  [0.023] [0.0235] [0.025]  [0.023] 
young*UMW_pre    0.012 0.004 0.012 0.000 
    [0.022] [0.014] [0.022] [0.002] 
young*UMW_post   -0.006  0.003  0.002  0.000 
    [0.023] [0.015] [0.016] [0.002] 
young*EMW_pre    0.016 0.006 0.008 0.000 
    [0.031] [0.023] [0.030] [0.002] 
young*EMW_post    -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 -0.001 
    [0.027] [0.022] [0.020] [0.003] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.237 0.237 0.237 0.237 0.237 
Observations  2589914 2589914 2589914 2589914 2589914 
TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female 
young*UMW  -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 
  [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.022] [0.023] 
young*EMW  -0.007 -0.013 -0.004 -0.005 -0.014 
  [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.024] [0.022] 
young*UMW_pre    0.003 0.000 0.005 0.000 
    [0.020] [0.013] [0.020] [0.002] 
young*UMW_post    -0.020 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 
    [0.020] [0.014] [0.014] [0.002] 
young*EMW_pre   0.004  0.001  -0.006  -0.001 
    [0.028] [0.022] [0.028] [0.003] 
young*EMW_post    -0.029 -0.023 -0.022 -0.004 
    [0.025] [0.021] [0.019] [0.003] 
Pseudo-R2  0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 
Observations  1302474 1302474 1302474 1302474 1302474 
TREATED: Young low education - CONTROL: Adult low education 
young*UMW  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.006 
  [0.028] [0.028] [0.030] [0.028] [0.029] 
young*EMW  0.000 -0.015 -0.004 -0.011 -0.013 
  [0.027] [0.028] [0.029] [0.030] [0.027] 
young*UMW_pre    0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.001 
    [0.027] [0.018] [0.027] [0.002] 
young*UMW_post    -0.006 0.000 0.008 -0.001 
    [0.031] [0.020] [0.020] [0.003] 
young*EMW_pre    -0.024 -0.008 -0.034 -0.003 38 
 
    [0.035] [0.028] [0.035] [0.003] 
young*EMW_post    -0.060* -0.040 -0.044*  -0.007* 
    [0.034] [0.028] [0.024] [0.004] 
Pseudo-R2  0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221 
Observations  1349757 1349757 1349757 1349757 1349757 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Young Adult 
young*UMW  -0.010 -0.008 -0.004 -0.013 0.015 
  [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.018] [0.021] 
young*EMW  -0.043** -0.074*** -0.043** -0.059***  -0.066*** 
  [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020] [0.017] 
young*UMW_pre    -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.001 
    [0.019] [0.012] [0.019] [0.001] 
young*UMW_post   -0.002  -0.014  -0.001  0.000 
    [0.023] [0.013] [0.015] [0.002] 
young*EMW_pre    -0.073*** -0.029 -0.069***  -0.009*** 
    [0.028] [0.021] [0.029] [0.002] 
young*EMW_post    -0.111*** -0.081*** -0.094*** -0.014*** 
    [0.022] [0.019] [0.017] [0.003] 
Pseudo-R2  0.287 0.287 0.287 0.287 0.287 
Observations  1257426 1257426 1257426 1257426 1257426 
 
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (cluster: time*region). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Reading: 
The table reports the incremental effect associated to an increase of the minimum wage by 10%, computed for the 
average treated individual. The values associated to young*UMW (_pre and _post), young*EMW (_pre and _post), 
young*ZMW (_pre and _post) refer respectively to the effect on young employment of the unexpected policy 
(2004:3), the set of all the expected policies, the set of the Zapatero expected policy (2005-2007). 
All equations control for gender, marital status, education, whether the individual attended any courses during the 
last month, region of residence (18 dummies), time (quarterly) effect and young specific seasonality. 
The length of the dynamics (_pre and _post) varies between columns: 
(1): no dynamics 
(2): _pre = 1 quarter before the policy; _post = 1 quarter after the policy 
(3): _pre = 2 quarter before the policy; _post = 2 quarter after the policy 
(4): _pre = 1 quarter before the policy; _post = 2 quarter after the policy 
(5): _pre = 2 quarter before the policy; _post = 1 quarter after the policy 
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Table 5. Employment (UMW vs. ZMW), Probit regression model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult 
young*UMW  -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003  -0.001 
 [0.022]  [0.022]  [0.024]  [0.022]  [0.023] 
young*ZMW  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006  0.008 
 [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.021]  [0.021]  [0.018] 
young*UMW_pre    0.010 0.004 0.011  0.000 
   [0.022]  [0.014]  [0.022]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post   -0.002  0.002  0.003  0.000 
   [0.024]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_pre    0.004 0.003 0.000  0.000 
   [0.022]  [0.016]  [0.021]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_post    -0.008 -0.008 -0.006  -0.001 
   [0.019]  [0.016]  [0.014]  [0.002] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.237 0.237 0.237 0.237  0.237 
Observations  2589914 2589914 2589914 2589914  2589914 
TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female 
young*UMW  -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.009  -0.003 
 [0.022]  [0.022]  [0.024]  [0.022]  [0.023] 
young*ZMW  -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002  -0.007 
 [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.020]  [0.019]  [0.018] 
young*UMW_pre    0.002 -0.002 0.003  0.000 
   [0.020]  [0.014]  [0.020]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post    -0.020 -0.008 -0.006  -0.002 
   [0.020]  [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_pre   0.004  0.001  -0.005  -0.001 
   [0.020]  [0.015]  [0.019]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_post    -0.019 -0.016 -0.015  -0.002 
   [0.018]  [0.015]  [0.014]  [0.002] 
Pseudo-R2  0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168  0.168 
Observations  1302474 1302474 1302474 1302474  1302474 
TREATED: Young low education - CONTROL: Adult low education 
young*UMW  -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.008  0.005 
 [0.028]  [0.028]  [0.030]  [0.028]  [0.030] 
young*ZMW 0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.004  -0.002 
 [0.022]  [0.022]  [0.025]  [0.025]  [0.023] 
young*UMW_pre    -0.004 -0.007 -0.002  -0.001 
   [0.027]  [0.018]  [0.027]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post   -0.009  -0.001  0.006  -0.001 
   [0.032]  [0.021]  [0.021]  [0.003] 
young*ZMW_pre    -0.010 -0.002 -0.019  -0.002 40 
 
   [0.025]  [0.020]  [0.024]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_post    -0.039 -0.029 -0.029  -0.005 
   [0.025]  [0.020]  [0.018]  [0.003] 
Pseudo-R2  0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221  0.221 
Observations  1349757 1349757 1349757 1349757  1349757 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Young Adult 
young*UMW  -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.026  0.016 
 [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.021]  [0.018]  [0.021] 
young*ZMW -0.046***  -0.047***  -0.047***  -0.049***  -0.051*** 
 [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.015] 
young*UMW_pre    -0.014 -0.016 -0.013  -0.002 
   [0.019]  [0.012]  [0.019]  [0.001] 
young*UMW_post    0.001 -0.006 0.004  0.001 
   [0.024]  [0.015]  [0.016]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_pre   -0.045**  -0.024  -0.047**  -0.006*** 
   [0.022]  [0.015]  [0.019]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_post   -0.071***  -0.056***  -0.067***  -0.009*** 
   [0.017]  [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.002] 
Pseudo-R2  0.287 0.287 0.287 0.287  0.287 
Observations  1257426 1257426 1257426 1257426  1257426 
 
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (cluster: time*region). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Reading: see Table 4 
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Table 6. Flows out of employment (UMW vs. EMW), Probit regression model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult 
young*UMW  0.011 0.010 -0.001 0.013  -0.011 
 [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.009] 
young*EMW 0.050***  0.071***  0.048***  0.063***  0.056*** 
 [0.015]  [0.017]  [0.016]  [0.018]  [0.016] 
young*UMW_pre    0.000 0.002 0.000  0.000 
   [0.008]  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.000] 
young*UMW_post    -0.012 0.002 -0.003  -0.001* 
   [0.009]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.000] 
young*EMW_pre   0.083***  0.047***  0.071***  0.003*** 
   [0.026]  [0.016]  [0.023]  [0.001] 
young*EMW_post   0.055***  0.040***  0.069***  0.002*** 
   [0.016]  [0.013]  [0.014]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164  0.164 
Observations  956407 956407 956407 956407  956407 
TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female 
young*UMW 0.023  0.023  0.018  0.028*  0.002 
 [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.017]  [0.0165]  [0.015] 
young*EMW 0.041*  0.063**  0.036  0.043*  0.055** 
 [0.023]  [0.025]  [0.023]  [0.025]  [0.024] 
young*UMW_pre    0.008 0.006 0.007  0.000 
   [0.013]  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.001] 
young*UMW_post    0.020 0.012 0.010  0.000 
   [0.020]  [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.001] 
young*EMW_pre    0.026 0.028 0.033  0.003*** 
   [0.034]  [0.022]  [0.033]  [0.001] 
young*EMW_post   0.075***  0.067***  0.086***  0.003*** 
   [0.027]  [0.022]  [0.022]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R2  0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160  0.160 
Observations  396849 396849 396849 396849  396849 
TREATED: Young low education - CONTROL: Adult low education 
young*UMW  0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.006  -0.013 
 [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.016]  [0.014] 
young*EMW  0.045** 0.061*** 0.044**  0.055**  0.050** 
 [0.020]  [0.023]  [0.021]  [0.023]  [0.021] 
young*UMW_pre    -0.004 0.000 -0.004  0.000 
   [0.015]  [0.010]  [0.016]  [0.001] 
young*UMW_post    -0.003 0.001 -0.002  0.000 
   [0.015]  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.001] 
young*EMW_pre    0.057** 0.041** 0.056** 0.003*** 42 
 
   [0.027]  [0.019]  [0.027]  [0.001] 
young*EMW_post   0.043*  0.032*  0.057***  0.002** 
   [0.023]  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R2  0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146  0.146 
Observations  435374 435374 435374 435374  435374 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Young Adult 
young*UMW 0.016  0.015  0.005  0.019*  -0.007 
 [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.009] 
young*EMW 0.045***  0.070***  0.049***  0.065***  0.055*** 
 [0.016]  [0.018]  [0.017]  [0.019]  [0.016] 
young*UMW_pre    0.009 0.007 0.009  0.001 
   [0.008]  [0.006]  [0.008]  [0.000] 
young*UMW_post    -0.014 -0.003 -0.008 -0.001* 
   [0.010]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.001] 
young*EMW_pre   0.076***  0.044***  0.070***  0.005*** 
   [0.027]  [0.016]  [0.025]  [0.001] 
young*EMW_post   0.067***  0.050***  0.078***  0.003*** 
   [0.020]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R2  0.131 0.131 0.131 0.131  0.131 
Observations  434228 434228 434228 434228  434228 
 
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (cluster: time*region). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Reading: 
The table reports the incremental effect associated to an increase of the minimum wage by 10%, computed for the 
average treated individual. The values associated to young*UMW (_pre and _post), young*EMW (_pre and _post), 
young*ZMW (_pre and _post) refer respectively to the effect of the unexpected policy (2004:3), the set of all the 
expected policies, the set of the Zapatero expected policy (2005-2007). 
All equations control for gender, education, contract type, working day lenght, time (quarterly) effect, region (18 
dummies), sector (3 dummies), occupation (10 dummies), whether the individual was employed in the public 
sector and whether she attended any courses during the last month. All the independent variables refer to the 
initial situation, before the exit from the employment pool. 
The length of the dynamics (_pre and _post) varies between columns: 
(1): no dynamics 
(2): _pre = 1 quarter before the policy; _post = 1 quarter after the policy 
(3): _pre = 2 quarter before the policy; _post = 2 quarter after the policy 
(4): _pre = 1 quarter before the policy; _post = 2 quarter after the policy 




Table 7. Flows out of employment (UMW vs. ZMW), Probit regression model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult 
young*UMW 0.012  0.012  0.002  0.024**  -0.012 
 [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.009] 
young*ZMW 0.050***  0.050***  0.058***  0.057***  0.053*** 
 [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.011] 
young*UMW_pre   -0.002  0.006  0.002  0.000 
   [0.008]  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.000] 
young*UMW_post    -0.012 -0.007 -0.008  -0.001** 
   [0.009]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.000] 
young*ZMW_pre   0.043***  0.036***  0.039***  0.002*** 
   [0.015]  [0.010]  [0.0130]  [0.000] 
young*ZMW_post   0.027***  0.028***  0.049***  0.001*** 
   [0.011]  [0.009]  [0.010]  [0.000] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164  0.164 
Observations  956407 956407 956407 956407  956407 
TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female 
young*UMW 0.025  0.025  0.023  0.040**  0.001 
 [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.015] 
young*ZMW 0.046***  0.046***  0.047***  0.042**  0.049*** 
 [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.016] 
young*UMW_pre    0.008 0.011 0.012  0.001 
   [0.013]  [0.011]  [0.014]  [0.001] 
young*UMW_post    0.020 0.004 0.005  0.000 
   [0.021]  [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_pre    0.010 0.024 0.020  0.002*** 
   [0.021]  [0.015]  [0.020]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_post   0.040**  0.045***  0.060***  0.002** 
   [0.018]  [0.016]  [0.015]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R2  0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160  0.160 
Observations  396849 396849 396849 396849  396849 
TREATED: Young low education - CONTROL: Adult low education 
young*UMW  0.006 0.006 -0.003 0.014  -0.013 
 [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.017]  [0.014] 
young*ZMW 0.039***  0.039***  0.043**  0.042**  0.040*** 
 [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.015] 
young*UMW_pre    -0.006 0.002 -0.002  0.000 
   [0.015]  [0.011]  [0.015]  [0.001] 
young*UMW_post    -0.002 -0.004 -0.004  -0.001 
   [0.015]  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_pre    0.027* 0.028** 0.029* 0.002*** 44 
 
   [0.016]  [0.013]  [0.016]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_post   0.020  0.022*  0.039***  0.001 
   [0.015]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R2  0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146  0.146 
Observations  435374 435374 435374 435374  435374 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Young Adult 
young*UMW 0.018*  0.018*  0.008  0.030***  -0.008 
 [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.009] 
young*ZMW 0.045***  0.046***  0.059***  0.056***  0.050*** 
 [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.011] 
young*UMW_pre    0.008 0.012* 0.012 0.001** 
   [0.008]  [0.006]  [0.008]  [0.000] 
young*UMW_post   -0.015  -0.011*  -0.013*  -0.002** 
   [0.010]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_pre   0.043**  0.035***  0.041***  0.003*** 
   [0.017]  [0.011]  [0.015]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_post   0.035***  0.032***  0.054***  0.002*** 
   [0.012]  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R2  0.131 0.131 0.131 0.131  0.131 
Observations  434228 434228 434228 434228  434228 
 
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (cluster: time*region). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Reading: see Table 6. 
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Table 8. Flows out of temporary employment (UMW vs. ZMW), Probit regression model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult 
young*UMW 0.027  0.027  0.011  0.042**  -0.007 
 [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.019]  [0.017] 
young*ZMW 0.060***  0.060***  0.074***  0.070***  0.064*** 
 [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.021]  [0.021]  [0.018] 
young*UMW_pre   -0.006  0.011  0.001  0.001 
   [0.015]  [0.013]  [0.016]  [0.001] 
young*UMW_post    -0.015 -0.013 -0.012  -0.002** 
   [0.013]  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_pre   0.049**  0.049***  0.047***  0.006*** 
   [0.021]  [0.015]  [0.018]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_post   0.028*  0.034**  0.063***  0.003** 
   [0.016]  [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059  0.059 
Observations  321076 321076 321076 321076  321076 
TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female 
young*UMW 0.036  0.036  0.034  0.055*  0.004 
 [0.029]  [0.029]  [0.032]  [0.031]  [0.027] 
young*ZMW 0.057**  0.057**  0.050*  0.041  0.064** 
 [0.025]  [0.025]  [0.026]  [0.025]  [0.025] 
young*UMW_pre    0.024 0.023 0.031  0.002 
   [0.025]  [0.019]  [0.026]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post    0.039 0.021 0.025  0.001 
   [0.031]  [0.019]  [0.020]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_pre    0.013 0.031 0.021  0.006*** 
   [0.032]  [0.022]  [0.029]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_post   0.049*  0.056**  0.077***  0.004** 
   [0.025]  [0.022]  [0.02]  [0.002] 
Pseudo-R2  0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061  0.061 
Observations  143464 143464 143464 143464  143464 
TREATED: Young low education - CONTROL: Adult low education 
young*UMW  0.013 0.013 -0.004 0.022  -0.015 
 [0.022]  [0.022]  [0.023]  [0.024]  [0.021] 
young*ZMW  0.054** 0.054** 0.064** 0.062**  0.054** 
 [0.026]  [0.026]  [0.031]  [0.031]  [0.027] 
young*UMW_pre    -0.022 -0.001 -0.015  0.000 
   [0.023]  [0.017]  [0.024]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post    -0.008 -0.013 -0.011  -0.002 
   [0.021]  [0.016]  [0.017]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_pre   0.035  0.044**  0.038*  0.005*** 46 
 
   [0.022]  [0.019]  [0.022]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_post   0.012  0.022  0.046***  0.002 
   [0.022]  [0.019]  [0.018]  [0.002] 
Pseudo-R2  0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066  0.066 
Observations  169643 169643 169643 169643  169643 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Young Adult 
young*UMW 0.022  0.022  0.007  0.039**  -0.015 
 [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.016] 
young*ZMW 0.057***  0.057***  0.075***  0.070***  0.065*** 
 [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.017] 
young*UMW_pre    0.012 0.023** 0.018  0.002** 
   [0.013]  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.001] 
young*UMW_post    -0.015 -0.014 -0.016  -0.002** 
   [0.015]  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_pre   0.060**  0.052***  0.062***  0.007*** 
   [0.025]  [0.017]  [0.02]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_post   0.048**  0.046***  0.077***  0.004*** 
   [0.019]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R2  0.058 0.058 0.059 0.058  0.059 
Observations  209894 209894 209894 209894  209894 
 
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (cluster: time*region). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 




Table 9. Flows out of permanent employment (UMW vs. ZMW), Probit regression model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult 
young*UMW -0.002  -0.002  -0.006  0.001  -0.010 
 [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.007] 
young*ZMW  0.022 0.022 0.019 0.019  0.022 
 [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.013] 
young*UMW_pre    0.008 0.000 0.009  0.000 
   [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.000] 
young*UMW_post   -0.001  0.004  0.003  0.000 
   [0.008]  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.000] 
young*ZMW_pre    0.019 0.014 0.015  0.001** 
   [0.013]  [0.009]  [0.012]  [0.000] 
young*ZMW_post   0.011  0.008  0.018**  0.000 
   [0.011]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.000] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066  0.066 
Observations  635331 635331 635331 635331  635331 
TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female 
young*UMW  0.018 0.018 0.015 0.023  0.010 
 [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.017] 
young*ZMW  0.012 0.012 0.018 0.020  0.010 
 [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.019] 
young*UMW_pre    -0.007 -0.007 -0.006  0.000 
   [0.010]  [0.008]  [0.010]  [0.000] 
young*UMW_post   0.008  -0.010  -0.010  0.000 
   [0.019]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_pre   -0.001  0.011  0.012  0.001 
   [0.017]  [0.015]  [0.019]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_post    0.013 0.013 0.019  0.001 
   [0.018]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R2  0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075  0.075 
Observations  253385 253385 253385 253385  253385 
TREATED: Young low education - CONTROL: Adult low education 
young*UMW  0.010 0.010 0.009 0.015  0.003 
 [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.015]  [0.014]  [0.013] 
young*ZMW  0.015 0.015 0.012 0.012  0.016 
 [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.020] 
young*UMW_pre    0.022 0.003 0.021  0.000 
   [0.014]  [0.009]  [0.014]  [0.001] 
young*UMW_post    0.005 0.005 0.004  0.000 
   [0.015]  [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_pre    0.011 0.008 0.012  0.001 48 
 
   [0.017]  [0.013]  [0.017]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_post    0.021 0.012 0.019  0.001 
   [0.017]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R2  0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059  0.059 
Observations  265731 265731 265731 265731  265731 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Young Adult 
young*UMW  0.007 0.007 0.003 0.010 -0.001 
 [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.010] 
young*ZMW  0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019  0.018 
 [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.013] 
young*UMW_pre    0.008 -0.001 0.009  0.000 
   [0.008]  [0.006]  [0.008]  [0.000] 
young*UMW_post    -0.005 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 
   [0.009]  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_pre    0.013 0.011 0.010 0.001* 
   [0.015]  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.001] 
young*ZMW_post    0.010 0.008 0.015  0.000 
   [0.012]  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.001] 
Pseudo-R2  0.049 0.049 0.050 0.050  0.050 
Observations  224334 224334 224334 224334  224334 
 
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (cluster: time*region). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 




Table 10. Flows into employment (UMW vs. EMW), Probit regression model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult 
young*UMW 0.040*  0.040*  0.044*  0.039  0.066*** 
 [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.026]  [0.024]  [0.025] 
young*EMW  0.022 0.009 0.016 0.014  0.016 
 [0.032]  [0.033]  [0.032]  [0.033]  [0.033] 
young*UMW_pre    0.000 -0.004 0.001  0.000 
   [0.016]  [0.017]  [0.016]  [0.0016] 
young*UMW_post   0.047*  0.005  0.005  0.005** 
   [0.027]  [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.002] 
young*EMW_pre    -0.052 -0.014 -0.013  -0.006*** 
   [0.037]  [0.030]  [0.041]  [0.002] 
young*EMW_post   -0.060**  -0.060***  -0.067***  -0.006** 
   [0.027]  [0.023]  [0.020]  [0.003] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102  0.102 
Observations  186182 186182 186182 186182  186182 
TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female 
young*UMW 0.039  0.040*  0.041  0.038  0.068** 
 [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.028]  [0.024]  [0.027] 
young*EMW 0.022  -0.002  0.021  0.012  0.009 
 [0.038]  [0.036]  [0.040]  [0.041]  [0.037] 
young*UMW_pre    0.005 0.002 0.006  0.000 
   [0.023]  [0.022]  [0.023]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post    0.052 -0.005 0.003  0.004 
   [0.047]  [0.027]  [0.029]  [0.004] 
young*EMW_pre   -0.083*  -0.010  -0.040  -0.007** 
   [0.044]  [0.041]  [0.052]  [0.003] 
young*EMW_post   -0.010***  -0.077***  -0.082***  -0.010*** 
   [0.029]  [0.029]  [0.025]  [0.004] 
Pseudo-R2  0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111  0.111 
Observations  112974 112974 112974 112974  112974 
TREATED: Young low education - CONTROL: Adult low education 
young*UMW  0.054 0.055 0.075 0.054  0.097** 
 [0.043]  [0.043]  [0.047]  [0.043]  [0.047] 
young*EMW  0.001 -0.023 -0.008 -0.020  -0.011 
 [0.040]  [0.039]  [0.041]  [0.043]  [0.041] 
young*UMW_pre   -0.039*  -0.037  -0.039*  -0.004 
   [0.024]  [0.023]  [0.024]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post    0.053 -0.002 0.005 0.005** 
   [0.035]  [0.023]  [0.026]  [0.002] 
young*EMW_pre   -0.099*  -0.056  -0.062  -0.010*** 50 
 
   [0.053]  [0.038]  [0.05]  [0.003] 
young*EMW_post   -0.055  -0.054*  -0.080***  -0.005 
   [0.037]  [0.033]  [0.026]  [0.004] 
Pseudo-R2  0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106  0.106 
Observations  102096 102096 102096 102096  102096 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Young Adult 
young*UMW  0.035  0.036 0.047* 0.035 0.066** 
 [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.026]  [0.023]  [0.026] 
young*EMW 0.009  -0.007  0.014  0.008  0.002 
 [0.033]  [0.034]  [0.033]  [0.034]  [0.034] 
young*UMW_pre    0.001 -0.003 0.002  0.000 
   [0.019]  [0.017]  [0.018]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post   0.023  -0.014  -0.011  0.002 
   [0.024]  [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.002] 
young*EMW_pre   -0.072***  -0.033  -0.039  -0.008*** 
   [0.024]  [0.028]  [0.031]  [0.003] 
young*EMW_post   -0.059**  -0.053**  -0.068***  -0.006** 
   [0.027]  [0.024]  [0.023]  [0.003] 
Pseudo-R2  0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088  0.088 
Observations  113430 113430 113430 113430  113430 
 
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (cluster: time*region). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Reading: 
The table reports the incremental effect associated to an increase of the minimum wage by 10%, computed for the 
average treated individual. The values associated to young*UMW (_pre and _post), young*EMW (_pre and _post), 
young*ZMW (_pre and _post) refer respectively to the effect of the unexpected policy (2004:3), the set of all the 
expected policies, the set of the Zapatero expected policy (2005-2007). 
All equations control for gender, education, time (quarterly) effect, region (18 dummies), whether the individual 
is looking for the first job or last sector (3 dummies) and occupation (10 dummies) where she was employed, 
whether she was in the public sector, attended any courses during the last month,  adopted active methods to 
search for a job, whether she was waiting to start a new job. All the independent variables refer to the initial 
situation, before the exit from the nonemployment pool. 
The length of the dynamics (_pre and _post) varies between columns: 
(1): no dynamics 
(2): _pre = 1 quarter before the policy; _post = 1 quarter after the policy 
(3): _pre = 2 quarter before the policy; _post = 2 quarter after the policy 
(4): _pre = 1 quarter before the policy; _post = 2 quarter after the policy 
(5): _pre = 2 quarter before the policy; _post = 1 quarter after the policy 
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Table 11. Flows into employment (UMW vs. ZMW), Probit regression model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult 
young*UMW 0.041*  0.041*  0.037  0.031  0.067*** 
 [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.027]  [0.024]  [0.026] 
young*ZMW  0.010 0.010 0.005 0.007  0.008 
 [0.028]  [0.028]  [0.027]  [0.027]  [0.027] 
young*UMW_pre    -0.008 -0.007 -0.009  -0.001 
   [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post   0.047*  0.005  0.005  0.005** 
   [0.027]  [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_pre    -0.035 -0.008 -0.008  -0.004*** 
   [0.024]  [0.020]  [0.027]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_post   -0.042**  -0.042**  -0.046***  -0.004** 
   [0.019]  [0.017]  [0.014]  [0.002] 
Pseudo-R
2  0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102  0.102 
Observations  186182 186182 186182 186182  186182 
TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female 
young*UMW 0.040*  0.040*  0.030  0.028  0.070** 
 [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.030]  [0.025]  [0.027] 
young*ZMW  0.012 0.012 0.016 0.009  0.010 
 [0.031]  [0.031]  [0.034]  [0.034]  [0.030] 
young*UMW_pre    -0.008 -0.003 -0.005  0.000 
   [0.022]  [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post    0.058 -0.008 0.003  0.004 
   [0.048]  [0.028]  [0.030]  [0.004] 
young*ZMW_pre   -0.062**  -0.004  -0.030  -0.005** 
   [0.030]  [0.028]  [0.034]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_post   -0.071***  -0.055**  -0.057***  -0.007*** 
   [0.022]  [0.022]  [0.018]  [0.002] 
Pseudo-R2  0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111  0.111 
Observations  112974 112974 112974 112974  112974 
TREATED: Young low education - CONTROL: Adult low education 
young*UMW  0.054 0.054 0.069 0.043  0.097** 
 [0.043]  [0.043]  [0.048]  [0.043]  [0.047] 
young*ZMW  -0.009 -0.009 -0.022 -0.010  -0.020 
 [0.034]  [0.034]  [0.035]  [0.038]  [0.032] 
young*UMW_pre   -0.041*  -0.041*  -0.046**  -0.004* 
   [0.024]  [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post    0.048 0.004 0.001  0.005** 
   [0.036]  [0.025]  [0.027]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_pre    -0.058 -0.038 -0.030  -0.007*** 52 
 
   [0.039]  [0.026]  [0.036]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_post   -0.030  -0.035  -0.054***  -0.003 
   [0.028]  [0.024]  [0.020]  [0.003] 
Pseudo-R2  0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106  0.106 
Observations  102096 102096 102096 102096  102096 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Young Adult 
young*UMW  0.036 0.036 0.041 0.027  0.067** 
 [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.027]  [0.023]  [0.027] 
young*ZMW -0.005  -0.005  0.001  0.002  -0.006 
 [0.028]  [0.028]  [0.028]  [0.028]  [0.028] 
young*UMW_pre    -0.005 -0.006 -0.007  -0.001 
   [0.018]  [0.016]  [0.018]  [0.002] 
young*UMW_post   0.025  -0.012  -0.010  0.003 
   [0.024]  [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_pre   -0.049***  -0.022  -0.027  -0.005*** 
   [0.016]  [0.019]  [0.021]  [0.002] 
young*ZMW_post   -0.040**  -0.037**  -0.048***  -0.004** 
   [0.019]  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.002] 
Pseudo-R2  0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088  0.088 
Observations  113430 113430 113430 113430  113430 
 
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses (cluster: time*region). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 






  A The model
A.1 Equilibrium conditions in state 2:
Let￿ s recall the ￿rm￿ s value function.
Job value function:
rJ2 (x) = x ￿ w2 + ￿
Z xu
d2
[J2 (s) ￿ J2 (x)]dH (s) ￿ ￿H (d2)[F + J2 (x)] (27)
Vacancy value function:
rV2 = ￿k + q2
Z xu
a2
[J2 (s) ￿ V2]dH (s) (28)
JOB DESTRUCTION:
The job destruction condition is
J2 (d2) = ￿F (29)
Subtracting 29 from 27, we get:






so that we can simplify the integral in 27, and rewrite the value function as:





(s ￿ d2)dH (s) ￿ ￿F (32)
Valuating the value function in d2, we get the job destruction equation:





(s ￿ d2)dH (s) ￿ rF (33)
MATCH FORMATION:
The job formation condition is
J2 (a2) = 0 (34)
Substituting condition 34 into equation 32 we get:





(s ￿ d2)dH (s) + ￿F = d2 + (r + ￿)F (35)
JOB CREATION:
The free entry condition is
V = 0 (36)
53Substituting the free entry condition into the value function of a vacancy, we get:
Z xu
a2




Furthermore, using the match formation condition and the linearity property of the job


















x ￿ w1 + ￿
R xu
d1 [J1 (s) ￿ J1 (x)]dH (s) ￿ [￿H (d1) + ￿1][F + J1 (x)] if x < d2
x ￿ w1 + ￿
R xu
d1 [J1 (s) ￿ J1 (x)]dH (s) ￿ ￿H (d1)[F + J1 (x)] + ￿1 [J2 (x) ￿ J1 (x)] if x ￿ d2
(40)
J1 (x) is composed by two linear segments with slope 1
r+￿+￿, if x < d2, and 1
r+￿, elsewhere.
Note that the distance between J2 (x) and the second segment of J1 (x) is equal to d2￿d1
r+￿+￿.
Therefore 3 cases are possible:
A. d1 < d2 and J1 (d2) > 0, i.e. the second segment J1 (x) lies above J2 (x) and does not
intersect the horizontal axis;
B. d1 < d2 and ￿F < J1 (d2) < 0, i.e. the second segment J1 (x) lies above J2 (x) and
intersects the horizontal axis;
C. d1 > d2, i.e. the second segment J1 (x) lies below J2 (x).
We can prove that the third case is impossible.
Let￿ s analyze the ￿rst two cases. After some computation, assuming d1 < d2, we can
rewrite the second segment of J1 (x) as:
(r + ￿)J1 (x) = x ￿ w1 + ￿[J2 (x) ￿ J1 (x)] ￿ ￿F + ￿[1 ￿ H (d2)]
d2 ￿ d1




r + ￿ + ￿
Z d2
d1









Using condition 29, we have that J1 (d2) > 0 is equivalent to:
C = (r + ￿ + ￿)[J1 (d2) ￿ J2 (d2)] > (r + ￿ + ￿)F (42)
54Let￿ s compute C using equations 41 and 32:
C = w2￿w1+
￿
r + ￿ + ￿
Z d2
d1





(s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿
Z xu
d2
(s ￿ d2)dH (s)
￿
(43)
We know that the second segment of J1 (x) is parallel to J2 (x) at distance d2￿d1
r+￿+￿, there-
fore it has also to be true that
C = d1 ￿ d2 (44)
JOB DESTRUCTION:
When J1 (d2) > 0, the job destruction threshold has to belong to the ￿rst segment.
Therefore, imposing the job destruction condition, we have:





d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s)








(s ￿ d2)dH (s) ￿ rF (45)
We can easily check that d1 < d2. Furthermore, substituting 33 into 45 condition 44 is
veri￿ed.
MATCH FORMATION:
Also the hiring standard has to belong to the ￿rst segment:





d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s)








(s ￿ d2)dH (s) (46)
= d1 + (r + ￿ + ￿)F
JOB CREATION:



















￿F < J1 (d2) < 0 is equivalent to:
C < (r + ￿ + ￿)F (48)
JOB DESTRUCTION:
When ￿F < J1 (d2) < 0 the job destruction threshold has to belong to the ￿rst segment.
Therefore we can use the result from case A:





d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s)








(s ￿ d2)dH (s) ￿ rF (49)
As for case A, condition 44 is veri￿ed.
MATCH FORMATION:
55Now the hiring standard has to belong to the second segment:





d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s)








(s ￿ d2)dH (s) + ￿F + ￿
d2 ￿ d1
r + ￿ + ￿
(50)
= d1 + (r + ￿)F + ￿
d2 ￿ d1
r + ￿ + ￿
JOB CREATION:









A.3 Impossibility of case C
Suppose that d1 > d2. Then, we can rewrite the second segment of J1 (x) as:





(s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿ ￿F (52)
In this case:





(s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿
Z xu
d2




It has also to be true that [r + ￿ + ￿][J1 (x) ￿ J2 (x)] = d1 ￿ d2, that is:





(s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿
Z xu
d2
(s ￿ d2)dH (s)
￿
= d1 ￿ d2 (54)
JOB DESTRUCTION:
When J1 (d2) < 0, the job destruction threshold has to belong to the ￿rst segment.
Therefore:





(s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿ rF + ￿
d2 ￿ d1
r + ￿ + ￿
(55)
Note that d1 > d2
If we substitute (JDC
1 ) and (JD2) in condition (35), we get:












r + ￿ + ￿
= A ￿ ￿
d2 ￿ d1
r + ￿ + ￿
6= A (56)
We have proved by contradiction that case C is impossible.
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